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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL BUT NOT THE PRESENCE OF 
COUNSEL: A SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 
FOR PRE-TRIAL RELEASE
John P. Gross*
Abstract
There is a widely-held belief that the state provides counsel to indigent 
criminal defendants at their initial appearance in state court. However, 
the majority of states do not provide counsel to indigent defendants at 
their initial appearance when a judicial officer determines conditions of 
pretrial release. State criminal procedure codes fail to provide the same 
procedural protections that defendants have in federal court. Indeed, 
states systems are characterized by predictive determinations regarding 
guilt, an overemphasis on the potential dangerousness of defendants, a 
lack of adequate pretrial services, and continued reliance on financial 
securities. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has done little to protect the constitutional 
rights of indigent criminal defendants when they initially appear before a 
judicial officer that has the power to restrict their liberty, despite the fact 
that the setting of bail implicates an indigent defendant’s right to counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment and the right to due process and equal 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has never found 
the setting of bail to be a critical stage of the proceedings that would 
require the presence of counsel or discussed what procedural safeguards 
should be in place to protect the rights of indigent defendants. These 
failures may contribute to rising rates of pretrial incarceration, a trend that 
the Court should take steps to reverse by finding a right to counsel at an 
indigent defendant’s initial appearance where a judicial officer has the 
power to place restrictions on their liberty. 
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INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, the Bail Reform Act of 19661 transformed the way in 
which federal judicial officials made decisions about pretrial release. 
Instead of requiring financial securities, such as cash or secured bonds, 
the act required federal judicial officials to release defendants on their
                                                                                                                     
1. Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (1966) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–51
(2012)). 
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own recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance 
bond unless such a release would not reasonably assure the appearance 
of the defendant. Judicial officers were permitted to consider the weight 
of the evidence against the defendant but were required to balance it 
against other factors such as a defendant’s ties to the community, 
reputation, and financial resources. The goal was to create a system where 
judicial officers made individualized determinations regarding pretrial 
release and where the wealth of the defendant was not the sole factor that 
determined whether he would remain at liberty before his trial.
To help accomplish that goal, the Act permitted judicial officers to 
impose certain conditions on a defendant’s release, such as releasing the 
defendant to the custody of a designated person or organization that 
would be responsible for the defendant’s supervision. This led to the 
development of pretrial service agencies that both assisted federal judicial 
officials by making recommendations regarding conditions of pretrial 
release and supervised defendants after their release. While the Bail 
Reform Act of 19842 permitted a federal judicial officer to consider the 
potential danger a defendant’s release posed to an individual or the 
community at large, it also afforded any defendant who was denied bail 
the right to a prompt hearing where counsel would represent the 
defendant, defendant has the right to cross examine witnesses, and the 
prosecution has the burden of proving that the defendant is dangerous by 
clear and convincing evidence. In federal courts, “liberty is the norm, and 
detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”3
The same is not true in state courts. The first Part of this Article 
discusses the procedures used in federal and state courts at a defendant’s 
initial appearance before a judicial officer who has the power to place 
restrictions on their liberty, with an emphasis on how those procedures 
impact indigent defendants.4 The majority of states does not provide 
counsel to indigent defendants at their initial appearance. For indigent 
defendants, states typically appoint counsel, but counsel is rarely present 
at indigent defendants’ initial appearance when a judicial officer 
determines conditions of pretrial release. 
An aspect of the federal system that states have embraced is that 
judicial officers set conditions of release based on the likelihood of 
conviction and the potential threat a defendant poses to public safety. 
However, states have failed to provide the same procedural protections 
that defendants have in federal court if they are denied bail.5 In sharp 
                                                                                                                     
2. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–450 
(2012)). 
3. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
4. See infra Part I.
5. See infra Subsections I.B.2–.3.
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contrast to the federal system, state judicial officers rely on financial 
securities to ensure a defendant’s return to court as evidenced by the 
continued use of bail schedules.6
While a pretrial service agency assists federal judicial officers in 
determining appropriate conditions of release and supervises defendants 
who are released, states have failed to create similar systems.7 Even 
though state judicial officers have the power to set a variety of pretrial 
release conditions, they typically lack the type of information needed to 
make an informed decision regarding the least restrictive conditions that 
would be necessary to ensure a defendant’s return to court. In addition, 
the absence of pretrial services discourages the release of low risk 
defendants. 
While the apathy of state legislatures toward indigent defense is 
certainly to blame, the Supreme Court has done little to protect the 
constitutional rights of indigent criminal defendants when they initially 
appear before a judicial officer that has the power to restrict their liberty. 
The second Part of this Article discusses how the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment supports 
the argument that the procedures currently in use in state courts for 
determining conditions of pretrial release make a defendant’s initial 
appearance a “critical stage” of the proceedings that requires the presence 
of counsel.8
Current state practices regarding pretrial release implicate the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in five specific ways. First, since the law 
requires judicial officers to consider factors such as the weight of the 
evidence against the defendant, the likely outcome at trial, and any 
potential defenses the defendant might have, one can view a defendant’s 
initial appearance as a trial-like confrontation that requires the presence 
of counsel.9 Second, while the Court has often tried to limit the right to 
counsel to proceedings that would have an impact on the outcome at trial, 
the overwhelming evidence is that pretrial incarceration negatively 
impacts trial outcomes for defendants.10 Third, the Court has also linked 
the right to counsel to actual incarceration, holding that if a court is to 
impose any amount of incarceration as a sentence, then they must provide 
counsel to an indigent defendant.11 If even a single day of incarceration 
following conviction implicates the right to counsel, then it is difficult to 
imagine that weeks or months of pretrial incarceration does not warrant 
                                                                                                                     
6. See infra Subsection I.B.4.
7. See infra Subsections I.B.4–.5.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Section II.A.
10. See infra Section II.C.
11. See infra Section II.D.
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the same protection.12 Fourth, the Court has also extended the right to 
representation beyond the trial to sentencing hearings.13 In many ways, a 
sentencing hearing, where a judicial officer often must decide between a 
sentence of probation or incarceration, takes into account many of the 
same factors that judicial officers must consider when making decisions 
regarding pretrial release.14 Fifth, the Court has also recognized the 
importance that pretrial representation, particularly in the context of plea 
bargaining, plays in the criminal justice system.15 Since the criminal 
justice system is now a system of pleas and not trials, defendants need 
more than just the early appointment of counsel; they need the actual 
presence of counsel at their initial appearance.
Even if the Supreme Court were to conclude that a defendant’s initial 
appearance before a judicial officer who has the power to restrict the 
defendant’s liberty was not a critical stage of the proceedings, pretrial 
incarceration implicates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause. The third Part of this Article examines the Court’s precedents 
regarding the procedural requirements that must be in place before there 
can be restrictions placed on someone’s liberty in civil proceedings.16 The 
procedural due process that the Court requires in the context of parole 
and probation revocation hearings and civil contempt proceedings calls 
into question whether current state practices provide adequate procedural 
safeguards to prevent the unwarranted deprivation of liberty. 
The Court has characterized pretrial detention in criminal cases as 
regulatory, not punitive; therefore, it does not amount to punishment 
before trial, which would violate the Due Process Clause. Two of the 
factors that weigh heavily in distinguishing between regulatory and 
punitive detention are that the nature and extent of the detention not be 
excessive in light of the harm it is trying to prevent and that the conduct 
it is trying to prevent is not already considered a crime.17 The failure of 
states to adopt less restrictive measures for ensuring a defendant’s 
appearance in court, like those provided by pretrial services agencies, 
makes the states’ continued reliance on pretrial detention excessive in 
light of the harm they are trying to prevent, specifically the defendant’s 
failure to appear. In addition, the failure of a defendant to appear in court 
following the defendant’s pretrial release is a crime in every state. “Bail 
Jumping” statutes have criminalized the harm states are trying to prevent 
through pretrial incarceration. This suggests that pretrial detention for 
defendants who are not considered to be dangerous and present a low risk 
                                                                                                                     
12. See infra Section II.D.
13. See infra Section II.E. 
14. See infra Section II.E.
15. See infra Section II.F.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Section III.B.
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of flight may no longer be fairly characterized as regulatory but has 
instead become punitive. 
The Supreme Court has made a distinction between when the right to 
counsel “attaches” and when the law entitles an indigent defendant to 
have a lawyer present in court. The fourth Part of this Article discusses 
how this distinction implicates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause for indigent defendants.18 The Court has clarified that 
the right to counsel attaches at a defendant’s first appearance before a 
judicial officer, which means that a defendant has an absolute right to 
legal representation at the initial appearance, but only if the defendant can 
afford to hire counsel. While the Equal Protection Clause does not require 
counsel to be appointed merely because it would be beneficial, it does 
require that a state ensure that an indigent defendant has a fair opportunity 
to present his defense.19 Because the initial appearance is a trial-like 
confrontation that can impact the ultimate outcome of the case, to permit 
the wealthy to have counsel but deny that same right to the indigent would 
amount to a violation of equal protection. 
Other state practices regarding pretrial release determinations may 
also violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Some 
judicial officers are required to affix an amount of bail to arrest warrants, 
and some rely on bail schedules that require the setting of a financial 
surety based solely on the offense charged.20 The U.S. Department of 
Justice has taken the position that these practices deny equal protection 
to indigent defendants. The continued reliance on financial sureties as a 
condition of pretrial release is especially troubling when the vast majority 
of criminal defendants in the country are unable to afford their own 
lawyer.
I. BAIL DETERMINATIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
The procedures that govern a defendant’s initial appearance before a 
judicial officer who has the power to place restriction on the defendant’s 
liberty vary from state to state, but there are more similarities than 
differences among them. State procedural codes also call for the 
consideration of many of the same factors that federal courts consider but 
lack the procedural protections afforded defendants in federal court.
A. Federal Procedures
In February of 1963, the Report of the Attorney General’s 
Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Justice described the 
                                                                                                                     
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Sections IV.A–.B.
20. See infra Section IV.C.
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bail hearing as “an obviously crucial stage in the administration of bail” 
but found that “American bail administration largely fails to provide the 
bail-setting authority with relevant factual data indispensable to sound 
bail decisions.”21 The report also found that “counsel is never or rarely 
assigned to the financially incapacitated accused”22 and concluded that 
“improvement of procedures at this stage is urgently required.”23 In 
August of 1964, in his testimony before the Subcommittees on 
Constitutional Rights and Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy 
described the bail setting practices then in use as “unrealistic and often 
arbitrary” and noted the “cruelty and cost” associated with unnecessary 
pretrial detention.24
Congress responded by passing the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,25
which established a comprehensive system for appointing and 
compensating lawyers to represent indigent defendants,26 and the Bail 
Reform Act of 1966, which required the release of a defendant on his 
personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance 
bond unless the judicial officer determines that release will not 
reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant.27 The Bail Reform 
Act also allowed the judicial officer to impose conditions of release, such 
as placing the defendant “in the custody of a designated person or 
organization”28 and placing restrictions on her “travel, association or 
place of abode”29 to secure her appearance at trial. It also set out the 
criteria that judicial officers should consider when imposing conditions 
of release such as 
the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the 
weight of the evidence against the accused, the accused’s 
family ties, employment, financial resources, character and 
                                                                                                                     
21. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 63 (1963), https://cjastudy.fd.org/sites/default/files/Previous-CJA-
Studies/Allen%20Committee%20Report%20(1963).pdf.
22. Id. at 64.
23. Id. at 67.
24. Hearing on Bail Legislation Before the Subcomms. on Constitutional Rights and 
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Judiciary Comm., 88th Cong. 2, 4 (1964) (statement 
of Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the United States), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/08-04-1964.pdf. 
25. Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (1964) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A 
(2012)).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.
27. Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214, 214–16 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–
50 (2012)).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1). 
29. Id. § 3146(a)(2).
7
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mental condition, the length of his residence in the 
community, his record of convictions, and his record of 
appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid 
prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings.30
While the Bail Reform Act did not eliminate the use of financial 
securities such as bail bonds,31 the goal was to eliminate a system where 
defendants, who had yet to be convicted, had to pay for their freedom.
Over the last fifty years, the procedures in federal court for 
determining the conditions of pretrial release have not remained static. 
Perhaps the two most significant developments over that time have been 
the increased reliance on pretrial services, both before and after the 
judicial officer makes a determination regarding pretrial release,32 and 
the ability to deny a defendant release based on a predication regarding 
her future dangerousness.33 Nevertheless, release without financial 
conditions remains the norm in federal court. That is not the case in state 
courts where judges continue to rely on financial securities when making 
decisions regarding pretrial release. 
                                                                                                                     
30. Id. § 3146(b).
31. Id. § 3146(a)(4).
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 3154(1) (“Pretrial services functions shall include the 
following: . . . Collect, verify, and report to the judicial officer, prior to the pretrial release 
hearing, information pertaining to the pretrial release of each individual charged with an offense, 
including information relating to any danger that the release of such person may pose to any other 
person or the community, and, where appropriate, include a recommendation as to whether such 
individual should be released or detained and, if release is recommended, recommend appropriate 
conditions of release . . . .”); id. § 3154(4) (“Pretrial services functions shall include the 
following: . . . Operate or contract for the operation of appropriate facilities for the custody or care 
of persons released under this chapter including residential halfway houses, addict and alcoholic 
treatment centers, and counseling services, and contract with any appropriate public or private 
agency or person, or expend funds, to monitor and provide treatment as well as nontreatment 
services to any such persons released in the community, including equipment and emergency 
housing, corrective and preventative guidance and training, and other services reasonably deemed 
necessary to protect the public and ensure that such persons appear in court as required.”); Betsy 
Kushlan Wanger, Limiting Preventive Detention Through Conditional Release: The Unfulfilled 
Promise of the 1982 Pretrial Services Act, 97 YALE L.J. 320, 325–30 (1987). In 1974, Congress 
passed the Speedy Trial Act, a portion of which authorized the creation of pretrial services 
programs in ten specified federal judicial districts. Id. at 326. These programs interviewed 
defendants before their initial appearance to provide the judicial officer with information on their 
background, recommended conditions of release, and pretrial supervision to defendants who were 
released. Id. at 326–27. These programs reduced the rate of pretrial detention and defendants who 
were under their supervision were less likely to be rearrested or fail to appear in court. Id. at 327. 
The success of these programs led to the enactment of the Pretrial Services Act in 1982, which 
expanded pretrial services to all federal judicial districts. Id. at 329.
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4) (stating that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 permitted the 
judicial officer making the bail determination to consider “the nature and seriousness of the 
danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release”).
8
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While the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure state that a defendant 
“who is unable to obtain counsel is entitled to have counsel appointed to 
represent the defendant at every stage of the proceeding from initial 
appearance through appeal,”34 the appointment procedure itself is the 
product of local court rules.35 In addition, the requirement that counsel be 
made available at a defendant’s initial appearance is undermined by the 
fact that, during a defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer, 
the defendant must be informed of their “right to retain counsel or to 
request that counsel be appointed,”36 and the judicial officer “must detain 
or release the defendant.”37
If the defendant is released from custody, and even if that release 
comes with certain conditions, it is difficult to argue that the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been violated in any meaningful 
way. A defendant’s initial appearance as laid out in the Rules of Federal 
Criminal Procedure is primarily ministerial. However, if the judicial 
officer decides to detain a defendant, then the detention triggers 
additional procedural protections. A detention hearing must be held and 
at that hearing, the defendant has “the right to be represented by counsel, 
and, if financially unable to obtain adequate representation, to have 
counsel appointed. The person shall be afforded an opportunity to testify, 
to present witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses who appear at the 
hearing, and to present information by proffer or otherwise.”38
Defendants in state courts do not have the same procedural protections, 
despite the fact that state judicial officials can consider the potential 
dangerousness of a defendant.39
                                                                                                                     
34. FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(a); see also United States v. Perez, 776 F.2d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 
1985) (finding that there is no constitutional right to counsel at a defendant’s initial appearance 
and giving the Rule 44(a) requirement that counsel be provided to an indigent defendant’s at the 
initial appearance “a common sense interpretation” since “[o]ne of the tasks performed at an initial 
appearance is the appointment of counsel” requiring “counsel be appointed before the judge asks 
routine questions such as the defendant’s name and financial ability would be self-defeating”), 
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Cabaccang, 332 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003).
35. FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(b).
36. Id. 5(d)(1)(B).
37. Id. 5(d)(3).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
39. See Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment & 
the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1330 (2012) (noting that the Federal Bail 
Reform Act of 1984 “was paralleled on the state level by no fewer than thirty-four states 
articulating specific statutory provisions allowing detention based on a defendant’s 
dangerousness, as opposed to a risk of flight”).
9
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B.  State Procedures
In the majority of states, indigent defendants are not provided with 
counsel when they first appear before a judicial officer who has the power 
to place restrictions on their liberty. The Supreme Court has made it clear 
that “a criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer, 
where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to 
restriction, marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger 
the attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”40 As will be 
discussed in more detail below, there is a difference between the 
“attachment” of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the 
requirement that counsel actually be present during a specific stage of the 
criminal proceeding.41
The Supreme Court has never specifically addressed whether there is 
a legal requirement that counsel be present at a defendant’s initial 
appearance where his liberty is subject to restriction. That may be, at least 
in part, because the Court is under the mistaken assumption that counsel 
is actually present in the vast majority of jurisdictions. Consider the 
following assertion made by the Court in McNeil v. Wisconsin,42 a case 
where the defendant was, in fact, represented at his bail hearing by a 
public defender: “The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the 
first formal proceeding against an accused, and in most States, at least 
with respect to serious offenses, free counsel is made available at that 
time and ordinarily requested.”43 The Court offers absolutely no support 
for this claim. The Court reiterates this claim in Rothgery v. Gillespie 
County44 where it references McNeil and the Amicus Brief of the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, stating that “[w]e are advised 
without contradiction that not only the Federal Government, including 
the District of Columbia, but 43 States take the first step toward 
appointing counsel ‘before, at, or just after initial appearance.’”45 There 
is a critical difference, however, between taking the first steps toward the 
appointment of counsel and the actual presence of counsel at a hearing 
where a judicial officer places restrictions on a defendant’s liberty. 
The fact that local custom and practice often trumps statewide rules 
of criminal procedure complicates determining the procedures used in the 
thousands of local courts throughout the country for handling a 
                                                                                                                     
40. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008).
41. See infra Part II.
42. 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
43. Id. at 173, 180–81.
44. 554 U.S. 191 (2008).
45. Id. at 203–04. 
10
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defendant’s first appearance before a judicial officer.46 Even when there 
is a clear statutory requirement that counsel be made available to an 
indigent defendant, it is often ignored.47
In addition, as the Supreme Court has noted, state criminal procedure 
can vary a great deal from one state to another.48 That being said, there is 
a great deal of consistency regarding the issues determined at a 
defendant’s initial appearance in state courts even if the procedures used 
to do so vary. Defendants are typically informed of the charges against 
them, advised of certain rights, including the right to have counsel 
appointed if they are indigent, conditions of pretrial release are 
determined, and, if the arrest was made without a warrant, the judicial 
officer determines if there was probable cause for the arrest.
The reality is that the majority of state court criminal procedural rules 
assume that counsel will not represent a defendant at her initial 
appearance before a judicial officer who has the authority to place 
restrictions on her liberty. 
1.  The Appointment but Not the Presence of Counsel
An examination of state criminal procedural codes concerning a 
defendant’s initial appearance, including the procedures used to assign 
counsel for the indigent, reveals that in thirty-two states, counsel for 
indigent defendants is not physically present at the initial appearance.49
In Alabama, at a defendant’s “initial appearance,” the judge or 
magistrate informs the defendant of the right to counsel and that if the 
defendant is indigent and unable to obtain counsel, that counsel will be 
appointed,50 and determines “conditions of release.”51
In Alaska, at the “misdemeanor arraignment or felony first 
appearance,” the judge or magistrate informs the defendant of the 
defendant’s right to counsel52 and “right to request the appointment of 
                                                                                                                     
46. See, e.g., Counsel at First Appearance, N.Y. ST. OFF. INDIGENT LEGAL SERVICES,
https://www.ils.ny.gov/content/counsel-first-appearance (last visited Feb. 23, 2017).
47. DeWolfe v. Richmond, 76 A.3d 962, 977–78 (Md. 2012) (holding that statutory law 
obligated the Office of the State Public Defender to represent indigent defendants at their initial 
appearance), on reconsideration, 76 A.3d 1019 (Md. 2013).
48. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123 (1975) (recognizing “that state systems of 
criminal procedure vary widely” and that “[t]here is no single preferred pretrial procedure”).
49. See Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon: The Illusory Right to Counsel 
at Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1. But see Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without 
Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333 (2011) (reaching a different conclusion regarding the 
availability of counsel at a defendant’s initial appearance based on a survey of public defenders 
and assigned counsel).
50. ALA. R. CRIM. P. 4.4(a)(3).
51. Id. 4.4(a)(4).
52. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 5(c)(3)(A).
11
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counsel at public expense if the defendant is financially unable to employ 
counsel”53 and “shall admit the defendant to bail.”54
In Arizona, at the suspect’s initial appearance, the magistrate shall 
“[a]ppoint counsel if the suspect is eligible for and requests appointed 
counsel”55 and “[d]etermine the conditions of release.”56
In Arkansas, once a judicial officer has informed a defendant of the 
charges, the right to remain silent, and the right to counsel, “[n]o further 
steps in the proceedings other than pretrial release inquiry may be taken 
until the defendant and his counsel have had an adequate opportunity to 
confer.”57
In Colorado, at the first appearance of the defendant in court, the judge 
informs the defendant that they have a right to counsel,58 that if they are 
indigent, they can apply for a court-appointed attorney, and “upon 
payment of the application fee, he or she will be assigned counsel”59 and 
“the amount of bail that has been set by the court.”60
In Georgia, at the first appearance, a judicial officer determines 
“whether or not the accused desires and is in need of an appointed 
attorney”61 and also sets the amount of bail.62 Indigent defendants in 
Georgia who have been taken into custody can then wait up to three 
business days before they are entitled to the services of appointed 
counsel.63
In Illinois, once arrested, a person is “taken without unnecessary delay 
before the nearest and most accessible judge”64 who then advises “the 
defendant of his right to counsel and if indigent shall appoint a public 
defender,”65 schedules a preliminary hearing when necessary,66 and 
admits a defendant to bail.67
                                                                                                                     
53. Id. 5(c)(3)(B).
54. Id. 5(c)(5).
55. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 4.2(a)(5).
56. Id. 4.2(a)(7).
57. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.3(b).
58. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-207(1)(b) (2016).
59. Id. § 16-7-207(1)(c).
60. Id. § 16-7-207(1)(e).
61. GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 26.1(C).
62. Id. 26.1(H).
63. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-23(b) (2016) (“[E]ntitlement to the services of counsel begins 
not more than three business days after the indigent person is taken into custody or service is made 
upon him or her of the charge, petition, notice, or other initiating process and such person makes 
an application for counsel to be appointed.”).
64. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/109-1(a) (2016).
65. Id. 5/109-1(b)(2).
66. Id. 5/109-1(b)(3).
67. Id. 5/109-1(b)(4).
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In Indiana, at the “initial hearing,”68 the judicial officer informs a 
defendant “that he has a right to assigned counsel at no expense to him if 
he is indigent”69 and “the amount and conditions of bail.”70
In Kentucky, at a defendant’s initial appearance before a judge, “[t]he 
defendant has the burden of first establishing his or her indigency before 
counsel may be appointed,”71 and if the court concludes that the 
defendant is indigent, “then the appointment shall continue for all future 
stages of the criminal proceeding.”72
Louisiana requires that someone who has been arrested be brought 
before a judge within seventy-two hours “for the purpose of appointment 
of counsel”73 and permits the court to “determine or review a prior 
determination of the amount of bail.”74
In Michigan, an arrestee will be brought to a judge for arraignment 
where the judge will inform the arrestee “of the right to a lawyer at all 
subsequent court proceedings,”75 and the judge will “determine what 
form of pretrial release, if any, is appropriate.”76 A recent report by the 
Michigan Indigent Defense Commission found that “[o]nly 6% of district 
courts require attorneys to be present at both the bail hearing and at 
arraignment, despite the documented importance of legal guidance in 
these early stages.”77
In Minnesota, “[t]he purpose of the first appearance is for the court to 
inform the defendant of the: defendant’s rights, including the right to have 
counsel appointed if eligible”78 but the court also “must set bail and other 
conditions of release.”79
In Montana, at a defendant’s initial appearance, if a defendant “desires 
assigned counsel because of financial inability to retain private 
                                                                                                                     
68. IND. CODE § 35-33-7-5 (2016).
69. Id. § 35-33-7-5(2).
70. Id. § 35-33-7-5(4).
71. KY. R. CRIM. P. 3.05(2).
72. Id.
73. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 230.1(A) (2016).
74. Id. art. 230.1(B); see also State v. Carter, 664 So. 2d 367, 370 (La. 1995) (implicitly 
approving of the setting of bond outside of the presence of appointed counsel).
75. MICH. CT. R. CRIM. P. 6.104(E)(3).
76. Id. 6.104(E)(5). But see MICH. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, PROPOSED MINIMUM 
STANDARDS SET 1 FOR DISTRIBUTION 7 (2015), http://michiganidc.gov/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/04/Proposed-Minimum-Standards-June-22-2015.pdf (requiring counsel be available to 
indigent defendants “as soon as the defendant’s liberty is subject to restriction by a magistrate or 
judge”).
77. JONAH A. SIEGEL, MICH. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, SNAPSHOT OF INDIGENT DEFENSE 
REPRESENTATION IN MICHIGAN’S ADULT CRIMINAL COURTS 1 (2016), http://michiganidc.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/MIDC-Court-Survey-Report-Feb-16.pdf. 
78. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 5.01(a)(2).
79. Id. 5.01(d).
13
Gross: The Right To Counsel But Not The Presence of Counsel: A Survey of
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
844 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
counsel . . . the court shall order the office of state public defender . . . to
assign counsel to represent the defendant without unnecessary delay”80
and also “admit the defendant to bail as provided by law.”81
Nebraska permits defendants who are unable to fulfill their conditions 
of release to request “a review by the judge who imposed the conditions” 
after they have been in custody for twenty-four hours,82 and “[i]f the 
defendant is indigent and unable to retain legal counsel, the judge shall 
appoint an attorney to represent the defendant for the purpose of such 
review.”83
Nevada gives indigent defendants the right to have counsel “at every 
stage of the proceedings from the defendant’s initial appearance before a 
magistrate,”84 but magistrates only inform indigent defendants of their 
right to have counsel appointed at their initial appearance while 
simultaneously setting bail.85 However, magistrates must delay holding a 
preliminary hearing if an indigent defendant has requested that counsel 
be appointed, since Nevada considers a preliminary hearing a critical 
stage of the proceedings.86
In New Jersey, if the offense charged is indictable, the defendant is 
informed of her right to appointed counsel and bail is set at the initial 
appearance.87
In New Mexico, the first appearance in court in response to a 
summons, warrant, or arrest is referred to as an “arraignment,” and the 
law requires the court to inform indigent defendants of their “right . . . to
representation by an attorney at state expense”88 and “enter an order 
prescribing conditions of release.”89
North Carolina calls for the representation “as soon as feasible after 
the indigent is taken into custody or service is made upon him of the 
                                                                                                                     
80. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-101(2) (2016); see also id. § 46-7-102(1)(c).
81. Id. § 46-7-102(2).
82. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-901.03 (2016).
83. Id.
84. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.397 (2016).
85. Id.; see also id. § 173.195.
86. Id. § 171.196(4); see also Schnepp v. Hocker, 429 F.2d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1970); 
Sheriff v. Witzenburg, 145 P.3d 1002, 1004 (Nev. 2006) (holding that “[b]ecause of the 
adversarial nature of the preliminary examination and the risk of substantial prejudice, criminal 
defendants are entitled to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the proceeding”).
87. N.J. R. CT. 3:4-2(c); see also State v. Fann, 571 A.2d 1023, 1030–31 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1990) (finding “[t]he setting of bail certainly is a ‘critical stage’ in the criminal 
proceedings” but concluding that “immediate arrangements for representation . . . in connection 
with the setting of bail, are impossible” and therefore holding that representation must be made 
available to indigent defendant “at the first bail review held after the first appearance”). 
88. N.M. R. CRIM. P. MAGIS. CTS. 6-501(A)(5).
89. Id. 6-501(E).
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charge”90 but only guarantees counsel at “[a] hearing for the reduction of 
bail, or to fix bail if bail has been earlier denied.”91
North Dakota gives an indigent defendant the right to counsel “at 
every stage of the proceeding from initial appearance through appeal,”92
but a magistrate merely informs a defendant of this right during his initial 
appearance93 and also sets bail.94
In Ohio, “[w]hen a defendant first appears before a judge or 
magistrate, the judge or magistrate shall permit the accused or the 
accused’s counsel to read the complaint” and “shall admit the defendant 
to bail.”95
In Oklahoma, a defendant’s application for counsel “shall state 
whether or not the indigent has been released on bond,” and if he has been 
released on bond, “the application shall include a written statement from 
the applicant that the applicant has contacted three named attorneys, 
licensed to practice law in this state, and the applicant has been unable to 
obtain legal counsel.”96
In Pennsylvania, counsel is “appointed to represent indigent 
defendants immediately after they are brought before the issuing 
authority in all summary cases in which a jail sentence is possible, and 
immediately after preliminary arraignment in all court cases.”97 While the 
law requires the judicial officer setting bail in Pennsylvania to consider a 
number of factors when setting bail, including “the nature of the offense 
charged and any mitigating or aggravating factors that may bear upon the 
likelihood of conviction and possible penalty,”98 they are explicitly 
prohibited from questioning the defendant about the offense charged.99
At a defendant’s initial appearance in Rhode Island, the judge must 
inform the defendant of “the defendant’s right to request the assignment 
of counsel if he or she is unable to obtain counsel . . . and, where 
                                                                                                                     
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-451(b) (2016).
91. Id. § 7A-451(b)(3).
92. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 44(a).
93. Id. 5(b)(1)(D).
94. Id. 5(b)(1)(F).
95. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 5(A).
96. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1355A (2016).
97. PA. R. CRIM. P. 122(C).
98. Id. 523(A)(1).
99. Id. 540(F); see also Flora v. Luzerne Cty., 103 A.3d 125, 140 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) 
(“At a preliminary arraignment, the defendant is advised of the charges against him, given a copy 
of the warrant and bail is set. These events do not require the presence of counsel because no 
rights are affected and there is no impact on the effectiveness of counsel’s representation at trial. 
Therefore, there is no right to counsel at the preliminary arraignment.”), aff’d in part and rev’d in 
part on other grounds sub nom. Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715, 751–52 (Pa. 2016).
15
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authorized by statute, shall admit the defendant to bail as provided in 
these rules.”100
At an initial appearance in South Carolina, indigent defendants can 
apply to the court for appointed counsel, and if the court grants their 
application, then an officer of the court “shall immediately notify the 
Office of the Public Defender . . . and the Public Defender shall 
immediately thereafter enter upon the representation of the accused.”101
Consider the following excerpt from the South Carolina Judicial 
Department’s Summary Court Judges Bench Book:
The bail proceeding is frequently the first contact between 
the accused and a judicial officer, with respect to the 
particular offense(s). For this reason, the bond proceeding is 
a very important phase of the criminal process, though it has 
never been held to be a stage at which the accused has the 
right to be represented by counsel. The accused may have 
his attorney present, but he has no absolute right to be 
represented.102
The Tennessee Practice series on Criminal Practice & Procedure 
contains the following advice:
Because the initial appearance immediately follows the 
custodial apprehension of the defendant, a lawyer is seldom 
retained at this early stage. However, if a defense attorney is 
present at the initial appearance, the defense attorney should 
inquire as to the validity of the warrant and participate in the 
bail determination.103
In Texas, the bail hearing is conducted without the presence of defense 
counsel,104 and when counsel is appointed for an indigent defendant may 
depend on the population of the county where the defendant is charged 
with a crime, rather than the Constitution.105
                                                                                                                     
100. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 5(b).
101. S.C. APP. CT. R. 602(c).
102. South Carolina Bench Book for Summary Court Judges § E(3), S.C. JUD. DEP’T,
http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/summaryCourtBenchBook/HTML/CriminalE.htm (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2017). 
103. 9 DAVID LOUIS RAYBIN, TENNESSEE PRACTICE SERIES: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3:7, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2015).
104. Lisa Falkenberg, For Those Accused in Harris County, It’s Time to Right a Legal 
Wrong, HOUS. CHRON. (Jan. 9, 2016, 11:32 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/
columnists/falkenberg/article/For-those-accused-in-Harris-County-it-s-time-to-6748263.php.
105. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051(c) (West 2015) (providing that counsel for an 
indigent defendant shall be appointed “as soon as possible, but not later than: (1) the end of the 
third working day after the date on which the court or the courts’ designee receives the defendant’s 
request for appointment of counsel, if the defendant is arrested in a county with a population of 
16
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A person arrested in Utah “shall be taken to the nearest available 
magistrate for setting of bail.”106 During this initial appearance before a 
magistrate, the magistrate must also make a determination regarding 
probable cause, an event that is not considered a critical stage of the 
proceedings that requires the presence of counsel.107 If the magistrate 
does find that there is probable cause, the magistrate must immediately 
make a bail determination based on “the recommended bail amount in the 
Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule unless the magistrate finds substantial cause 
to deviate from the Schedule.”108
In Vermont, during the initial appearance before a judicial officer, 
there is a determination of probable cause,109 the defendant is informed 
of the charges,110 the right to counsel,111 the right to remain silent,112 the 
general circumstances under which the defendant can secure pretrial 
release113 and, if not represented by counsel, “of the nature and 
approximate schedule of further pretrial proceedings.”114 While no 
further proceedings shall be had until the judicial officer has assigned 
counsel and the defendant has had the opportunity to consult with 
counsel,115 the law requires the judicial officer at that time to “determine 
whether and on what conditions the defendant shall be released pending 
trial.”116
A defendant in Washington has a right to a lawyer “as soon as feasible 
after the defendant has been arrested, appears before a committing 
magistrate, or is formally charged, whichever occurs earliest.”117 While 
counsel should be provided to an indigent defendant at a preliminary 
                                                                                                                     
less than 250,000; or (2) the end of the first working day after the date on which the court or the 
courts’ designee receives the defendant’s request for appointment of counsel, if the defendant is 
arrested in a county with a population of 250,000 or more”).
106. UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7(b).
107. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122, 126 (1975); Seibold v. Turner, 435 P.2d 289, 290–
91 (Utah 1967).
108. UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(3)(B).
109. VT. R. CRIM. P. 5(c).
110. Id. 5(d)(1).
111. Id. 5(d)(2).
112. Id. 5(d)(3).
113. Id. 5(d)(4).
114. Id. 5(d)(5).
115. Id. 5(f).
116. Id. 5(h).
117. WASH. CRIM. R. CTS. LTD. JURIS. 3.1(b)(1).
17
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appearance where the conditions of pretrial release are determined,118
evidence suggests that this rule is not always followed.119
In West Virginia, judicial officers “shall allow the defendant 
reasonable time and opportunity to consult with counsel or with at least 
one relative or other person for the purpose of obtaining counsel or 
arranging bail.”120
In Wisconsin, the judicial officer informs a defendant at the initial 
appearance of the defendant’s right to counsel and that “an attorney will 
be appointed to represent him or her if he or she is financially unable to 
employ counsel,”121 and the judicial officer “shall admit the defendant to 
bail.”122
At a defendant’s initial appearance in Wyoming, “the court shall 
advise any defendant who is a needy person of his right to be represented 
by an attorney at public expense,”123 and if the defendant wishes to have 
an attorney, “the court shall notify an available public defender for the 
judicial district or shall appoint an attorney to represent the needy person 
if no public defender is available.”124 The Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure make the determination of financial eligibility for assigned 
counsel “a judicial function” and state that “[a]n attorney should be 
appointed at the earliest time after a defendant makes a request, but only 
after appropriate inquiry into the defendant’s financial circumstances and 
a determination of eligibility.”125
Florida is an exception to the general rule that counsel need not be 
present at an initial appearance before a judge or magistrate who has the 
authority to restrict the defendant’s liberty.126
                                                                                                                     
118. Id. 3.2.1(e)(1) (“At the preliminary appearance, the court shall provide for a 
lawyer . . . for pretrial release . . . .”).
119. 12 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 202, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2016) (“The notification of the attorney’s 
appointment is ordinarily made by telephone as soon as is practicable after the appointment.”); 
see also Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1133 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (finding 
that cities’ public defense system deprived indigent criminal defendants of their Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel).
120. W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 5(c).
121. WIS. STAT. § 970.02(1)(b) (2016).
122. Id. § 970.02(2).
123. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-6-105(b) (2016); see also Chavez v. State, 604 P.2d 1341, 1347 
(Wyo. 1979) (holding that counsel does not need to be present prior to a preliminary hearing).
124. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-6-105(b).
125. WYO. R. CRIM. P. 44(b)(1).
126. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.111(a) (“A person entitled to appointment of counsel as provided 
herein shall have counsel appointed when the person is formally charged with an offense, or as 
soon as feasible after custodial restraint, or at the first appearance before a committing judge, 
whichever occurs earliest.”); see also id. 3.130(c)(1) (“If practicable, the judge should determine 
prior to the first appearance whether the defendant is financially able to afford counsel and 
18
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Idaho is another exception; indigent defendants are entitled “[t]o be 
represented by an attorney to the same extent as a person having his  own 
counsel is so entitled,”127 which has led the Court of Appeals of Idaho to 
require the appointment of counsel “unless a court determines the 
proceeding is not one that a reasonable person with adequate means 
would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous 
proceeding.”128
Maine permits a court to designate “a lawyer for the day” to represent 
an indigent defendant at their initial appearance but does not require it 
before setting bail.129
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held that, because 
a defendant’s liberty is at stake in a bail hearing and a preventive 
detention hearing, that “the principles of procedural due process 
in . . . the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights” require the presence of 
counsel for indigent defendants.130
New Mexico uses language similar to that found in Idaho to define 
when an indigent defendant has the right to representation. In New 
Mexico, an indigent defendant “is entitled to be represented by an 
attorney to the same extent as a person having his own counsel”131 and is 
entitled to be “counseled and defended at all stages of the matter 
beginning with the earliest time when a person providing his own counsel 
would be entitled to be represented by an attorney.”132
The Court of Appeals of New York has held that because indigent 
defendants have the “right to the aid of counsel at the arraignment and at 
every subsequent stage of the action,”133 a court cannot proceed to arraign 
a defendant and set bail without counsel being present.134 That being said, 
the New York State Office of Indigent Legal Services has acknowledged 
                                                                                                                     
whether the defendant desires representation. When the judge determines that the defendant is 
entitled to court-appointed counsel and desires counsel, the judge shall immediately appoint 
counsel. This determination must be made and, if required, counsel appointed no later than the 
time of the first appearance and before any other proceedings at the first appearance.”).
127. IDAHO CODE § 19-852(1)(a) (2016).
128. State v. Wegner, No. 33960, 2009 WL 32484, at *3 (Idaho Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2009), aff’d,
220 P.3d 1089, 1090 (Idaho 2009).
129. ME. R. CRIM. P. 5(e).
130. Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 902–03 (Mass. 2004).
131. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-3(A) (2016).
132. Id. § 31-16-3(B)(1).
133. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.10(3) (McKinney 2016).
134. See Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 223 (N.Y. 2010) (holding that “nothing 
in the statute may be read to justify the conclusion that the presence of defense counsel at 
arraignment is ever dispensable, except at a defendant’s informed option, when matters affecting 
the defendant’s pretrial liberty or ability subsequently to defend against the charges are to be 
decided”). 
19
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that “persons deemed eligible for indigent legal defense services continue 
to be arraigned without counsel at first appearance.”135
Following a recent decision by the Maryland Court of Appeals, the 
Office of the State Public Defender must now represent indigent 
defendants at their initial appearance.136
If a defendant appears without counsel for arraignment in Oregon, the 
court must inform the defendant that he has a right to counsel and delay 
the arraignment if the defendant requests to have counsel appointed.137
Virginia also grants a defendant a right to a bail hearing “as soon as 
practicable but in no event later than three calendar days, excluding 
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays”138 and the right to counsel at that 
hearing.139
2.  Considering the Weight of the Evidence and the Likelihood 
of Conviction
Thirty-one states expect judicial officers to assess the quality of the
evidence against a defendant, estimate the likelihood of conviction, and 
the potential sentence that would be imposed when making a 
determination regarding bail. These predictive determinations regarding 
the defendant’s guilt take place at the defendant’s initial appearance 
where, as previously described, defendants typically do not have the 
benefit of legal representation. 
Nineteen states ask the judicial officer who presides over a 
defendant’s initial appearance to consider the weight of the evidence: 
                                                                                                                     
135. Counsel at First Appearance, NYS OFF. INDIGENT LEGAL SERVICES,
https://www.ils.ny.gov/content/counsel-first-appearance (last visited Feb. 23, 2016).
136. See DeWolfe v. Richmond, 76 A.3d 1019, 1031 (Md. 2013) (“At a defendant’s initial 
appearance before a District Court Commissioner . . . the defendant is in custody and, unless 
released on his or her personal recognizance or on bail, the defendant will remain incarcerated 
until a bail review hearing before a judge. Consequently, we hold that, under Article 24 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights, an indigent defendant is entitled to state-furnished counsel at an 
initial hearing before a District Court Commissioner.” (footnote omitted)).
137. OR. REV. STAT. § 135.040 (2016) (“If the defendant appears for arraignment without 
counsel, the defendant shall be informed by the court that it is the right of the defendant to have 
counsel before being arraigned and shall be asked if the defendant desires the aid of counsel.”).
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-158 (2016).
139. Id. (providing that prior to the bail hearing “the accused shall be allowed a reasonable 
opportunity to employ counsel of his own choice, or, if appropriate, the statement of 
indigence . . . may be executed”).
20
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Alaska,140 Arizona,141 Florida,142 Kansas,143 Louisiana,144 Minnesota,145
Missouri,146 Montana,147 New Mexico,148 New York,149 North 
Carolina,150 North Dakota,151 Ohio,152 Rhode Island,153 South Dakota,154
                                                                                                                     
140. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.011(c)(2) (2016) (“In determining the conditions of release 
under this chapter, the court shall consider . . . the weight of the evidence against the 
person . . . .”), repealed and reenacted by Act of July 11, 2016, ch. 36, sec. 59, § 12.30.011(i)(2), 
2016 Alaska Sess. Laws 33 (effective Jan. 1, 2018).
141. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3967(B)(6) (2016) (“In determining the method of release 
or the amount of bail, the judicial officer . . . shall take into account all of the following: [t]he 
weight of evidence against the accused.”).
142. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131(3) (“In determining whether to release a defendant on bail or 
other conditions, and what that bail or those conditions may be, the court may consider . . . the 
weight of the evidence against the defendant . . . .”).
143. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2802(8) (2016) (“In determining which conditions of release will 
reasonably assure appearance and the public safety, the magistrate shall . . . take into 
account . . . the weight of the evidence against the defendant . . . .”).
144. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 334(2) (2016) (“The amount of bail shall be such that, 
in the judgment of the court, commissioner, or magistrate, it will insure the presence of the 
defendant, as required, and the safety of any other person and the community, having regard to: 
The weight of the evidence against the defendant.”).
145. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.02(2)(a)–(b) (“In determining conditions of release the court must 
consider: the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; the weight of the evidence . . . .”).
146. MO. REV. STAT. § 544.455(2) (2013) (“In determining which conditions of release will 
reasonably assure appearance, the associate circuit judge or judge shall . . . take into 
account . . . the weight of the evidence against the accused . . . .”).
147. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-9-109(2)(b) (2015) (“In determining whether the defendant 
should be released or detained, the court shall take into account the available information 
concerning: the weight of the evidence against the defendant . . . .”).
148. N.M. R. CRIM. P. 6-401(B)(2) (“[The court considers] the weight of the evidence against 
the person” when determining “conditions of release.”).
149. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(a)(viii) (McKinney 2016) (“[Judges must consider] 
the weight of the evidence . . . in the pending criminal action and any other factor indicating 
probability or improbability of conviction [when making a bail determination].”).
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534(c) (2015) (“In determining which conditions of release to 
impose, the judicial official must, on the basis of available information, take into account . . . the 
weight of the evidence against the defendant . . . .”).
151. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 46(3)(B) (“In determining conditions of release that will reasonably 
assure appearance of a person, the magistrate . . . must consider: the weight of the evidence 
against the person . . . .”).
152. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 46(C)(2) (“In determining the types, amounts, and conditions of bail, 
the court shall consider all relevant information, including but not limited to: The weight of the 
evidence against the defendant . . . .”).
153. R. CRIM. P. R.I. SUPER. CT. 46(c) (“If the defendant is admitted to bail, the terms thereof 
shall be such as in the judgment of the court will insure the presence of the defendant, having 
regard to . . . the weight of the evidence against the defendant . . . .”).
154. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-43-4 (2016) (“In determining which conditions of release 
will reasonably assure appearance, a committing magistrate or court shall . . . take into
account . . . the weight of the evidence against the defendant . . . .”).
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Vermont,155 Virginia,156 and Wyoming.157
Another nine states ask the judicial officer who presides over a 
defendant’s initial appearance to consider the likelihood or probability of 
conviction and sentence: Alabama,158 Arkansas,159 Colorado,160 Idaho,161
Michigan,162 Nevada,163 New Jersey,164 Pennsylvania,165 and 
Tennessee.166
                                                                                                                     
155. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7554(b) (2016) (“In determining which conditions of release 
to impose . . . the judicial officer shall . . . take into account . . . the weight of the evidence against 
the accused . . . .”).
156. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-121(iii) (2016) (“The judicial officer shall take into 
account . . . the weight of the evidence . . . .”).
157. WYO. R. CRIM. P. 46.1(d)(2) (“The judicial officer shall . . . take into account the 
available information concerning: The weight of the evidence against the person . . . .”).
158. ALA. R. CRIM. P. 7.2(a)(6) (“The nature of the offense charged, the apparent probability 
of conviction, and the likely sentence, insofar as these factors are relevant to the risk of 
nonappearance.”).
159. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.5(b)(vi) (“The inquiry should take the form of an assessment of 
factors relevant to the pretrial release decision, such as: the nature of the current charge and any 
mitigating or aggravating factors that may bear on the likelihood of conviction and the possible 
penalty.”).
160. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-103(5)(f) (2016) (“The likely sentence, considering the nature 
and the offense presently charged . . . .”).
161. IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 46(c)(6) (“The determination of whether a defendant should be 
released upon the defendant’s own recognizance or admitted to bail, and the determination of the 
amount and conditions of bail, if any, can be made after considering any of the following factors: 
The nature of the current charge and any mitigating or aggravating factors that may bear on the 
likelihood of conviction and the possible penalty.”).
162. MICH. R. CRIM. P. 6.106(F)(1)(e) (requiring that when a court is making a decision 
regarding pretrial release and the appropriate conditions of release, the court “is to consider 
relevant information, including the seriousness of the offense charged, the presence or absence of 
threats, and the probability of conviction and likely sentence”).
163. NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.4853(7) (2015) (“[A court shall consider t]he nature of the 
offense with which the person is charged, the apparent probability of conviction and the likely 
sentence, insofar as these factors relate to the risk of not appearing.”).
164. N.J. R. CRIM. P. 3:26-1(a)(1) (“[The court considers] the seriousness of the crime 
charged against defendant, the apparent likelihood of conviction, and the extent of the punishment 
prescribed by the Legislature.”), amended by N.J. Court Order 0021 (Aug. 30, 2016).
165. PA. R. CRIM. P. 523(1) (“[T]he bail authority shall consider . . . the nature of the offense 
charged and any mitigating or aggravating factors that may bear upon the likelihood of conviction 
and possible penalty . . . .”).
166. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-115(7) (2016) (“[T]he magistrate shall take into account: 
The nature of the offense and the apparent probability of conviction and the likely sentence, 
insofar as these factors are relevant to the risk of nonappearance . . . .”).
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Judicial officers consider the nature of the evidence against the 
defendant in Maine167 and Maryland,168 the strength and character of the 
evidence in Wisconsin,169 and both the weight of the evidence against a 
defendant or the likelihood of conviction in Illinois.170
While federal magistrates consider “the weight of the evidence against 
the accused” when determining conditions of release, there is evidence to 
suggest that it is given less weight than some other factors.171
3.  Considering the Potential Dangerousness of the Defendant
Twenty-eight states permit a judicial officer to deny bail to a 
defendant who the judicial officer believes poses a threat to an individual 
or the community at large: Alabama,172 Alaska,173 California,174
                                                                                                                     
167. ME. STAT. tit. 15, § 1026(4)(B) (2016) (“In setting bail, the judicial officer shall . . . take 
into account the available information concerning the following: The nature of the evidence 
against the defendant . . . .”).
168. MD. R. CRIM. P. 4-216(e)(1)(A) (“In determining whether a defendant should be 
released and the conditions of release, the judicial officer shall take into account the following 
information, to the extent available: the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the 
nature of the evidence against the defendant, and the potential sentence upon conviction . . . .”). 
169. WIS. STAT. § 969.01(4) (2016) (“Proper considerations in determining whether to 
release the defendant without bail, fixing a reasonable amount of bail or imposing other reasonable 
conditions of release are . . . the character and strength of the evidence which has been presented 
to the judge . . . .”).
170. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/110-5(a) (2016) (“In determining the amount of monetary bail 
or conditions of release, if any . . . the court shall . . . take into account such matters as the nature 
and circumstances of the offense charged . . . the likelihood of conviction, the sentence applicable 
upon conviction, the weight of the evidence against such defendant . . . .”). 
171. United States v. Birges, 523 F. Supp. 468, 470 (D. Nev. 1981) (“The weight of the 
evidence against the accused is also an indication that she may flee. However, the weight of the 
evidence is to be accorded less weight than the other factors.”).
172. ALA. R. CRIM. P. 7.2(a) (“Any defendant charged with an offense bailable as a matter 
of right may be released . . . unless the court or magistrate determines that such a release will not 
reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance as required, or that the defendant’s being at large 
will pose a real and present danger to others or to the public at large.”).
173. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.011(b) (2016) (“If a judicial officer determines that the release 
under (a) of this section will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person or will pose a 
danger to the victim, other persons, or the community, the officer shall impose the least restrictive 
condition or conditions that will reasonably assure the person’s appearance and protect the victim, 
other persons, and the community.”), amended by Act of July 11, 2016, ch. 36, sec. 59, 2016 
Alaska Sess. Laws 34 (effective Jan. 1, 2018).
174. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275(a)(1) (West 2016) (“In setting, reducing, or denying bail, a 
judge or magistrate shall take into consideration the protection of the public, the seriousness of 
the offense charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his or 
her appearing at trial or at a hearing of the case. The public safety shall be the primary 
consideration.”).
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Colorado,175 Florida,176 Georgia,177 Idaho,178 Iowa,179 Kentucky,180
Maine,181 Maryland,182 Michigan,183 Minnesota,184 Missouri,185
                                                                                                                     
175. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-103(3)(a) (2016) (“The type of bond and conditions of release 
shall be sufficient to reasonably ensure the appearance of the person as required and to protect the 
safety of any person or the community, taking into consideration the individual characteristics of 
each person in custody, including the person’s financial condition.”).
176. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131(b)(1) (“The judicial officer shall impose the first of the following 
conditions of release that will reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to 
persons, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process . 
. . .”).
177. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1(e) (2016) (“A court shall be authorized to release a person on 
bail if the court finds that the person: (1) Poses no significant risk of fleeing from the jurisdiction 
of the court or failing to appear in court when required; (2) Poses no significant threat or danger 
to any person, to the community, or to any property in the community . . . .”).
178. IDAHO CODE § 19-2902(2) (2016) (“The purpose of this chapter is to provide a uniform 
and comprehensive statewide process for the administration of bail in criminal cases in order to: 
(a) Ensure the appearance of defendants before the courts; (b) Protect the right of defendants to 
bail, as constitutionally provided; and (c) Ensure the protection and safety of victims, witnesses 
and the public.”).
179. IOWA CODE § 811.2(1)(a) (2016) (“All bailable defendants shall be ordered released 
from custody pending judgment or entry of deferred judgment on their personal recognizance, or 
upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by the magistrate 
unless the magistrate determines in the exercise of the magistrate’s discretion, that such a release 
will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required or that release will 
jeopardize the personal safety of another person or persons.”).
180. KY. R. CRIM. P. 4.16(1) (“The amount of bail shall be sufficient to insure compliance 
with the conditions of release set by the court. . . . In determining such amount the court shall 
consider . . . the defendant’s reasonably anticipated conduct if released and the defendant’s 
financial ability to give bail.”).
181. ME. STAT. tit. 15, § 1002 (2016) (“It is the purpose and intent of this chapter that bail 
be set for a defendant in order to reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant as required, 
to otherwise reasonably ensure the integrity of the judicial process and, when applicable, to 
reasonably ensure the safety of others in the community.”).
182. MD. CT. R. 4-216(e)(3) (“If the judicial officer determines that the defendant should be 
released . . . the judicial officer shall impose on the defendant the least onerous condition or 
combination of conditions of release . . . that will reasonably: (A) ensure the appearance of the 
defendant as required, (B) protect the safety of the alleged victim by ordering the defendant to 
have no contact with the alleged victim or the alleged victim’s premises or place of employment 
or by other appropriate order, and (C) ensure that the defendant will not pose a danger to another 
person or to the community.”).
183. MICH. CT. R. 6.106(C) (“[T]he court must order the pretrial release of the defendant on 
personal recognizance, or on an unsecured appearance bond . . . unless the court determines that 
such release will not reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant as required, or that such 
release will present a danger to the public.”).
184. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.02(1) (“On appearance before the court, a person must be released 
on personal recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond unless a court determines that release 
will endanger the public safety or will not reasonably assure the defendant's appearance.”).
185. MO. REV. STAT. § 544.457.1 (2016) (“[U]pon a showing that the defendant poses a 
danger to a crime victim, the community, or any other person, the court may use such information 
24
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Montana,186 Nebraska,187 Nevada,188 New Hampshire,189 North 
Carolina,190 Oregon,191 South Carolina,192 South Dakota,193 Texas,194
                                                                                                                     
in determining the appropriate amount of bail, to increase the amount of bail, to deny bail entirely 
or impose any special conditions which the defendant and surety shall guarantee.”).
186. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-9-109(2)(d) (2015) (“In determining whether the defendant 
should be released or detained, the court shall take into account the available information 
concerning: the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would 
be posed by the defendant’s release . . . .”).
187. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-901 (2016) (“Any bailable defendant shall be ordered released 
from custody pending judgment on his or her personal recognizance unless the judge determines 
in the exercise of his or her discretion that such a release will not reasonably assure the appearance 
of the defendant as required or that such a release could jeopardize the safety and maintenance of 
evidence or the safety of victims, witnesses, or other persons in the community.”).
188. NEV. STAT. § 178.4851(1) (2015) (“[A]court may release without bail any person 
entitled to bail if it appears to the court that it can impose conditions on the person that will 
adequately protect the health, safety and welfare of the community and ensure that the person will 
appear at all times and places ordered by the court.”).
189. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597:2(II) (2016) (requiring that a court shall order the pretrial 
release of the defendant “unless the court determines that such release will not reasonably assure 
the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of the person or of any other 
person or the community”).
190. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534(b) (2016) (stating judge must release a defendant “unless 
he  determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as 
required; will pose a danger of injury to any person; or is likely to result in destruction of evidence, 
subornation of perjury, or intimidation of potential witnesses”).
191. OR. REV. STAT. § 135.245(3) (2016) (“[T]he magistrate shall impose the least onerous 
condition reasonably likely to ensure the safety of the public and the victim and the person’s later 
appearance . . . .”).
192. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-10(A) (2016) (mandating that a court should release a person 
charged with a noncapital offense “unless the court determines in its discretion that such a release” 
will result in “unreasonable danger to the community or an individual”).
193. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-43-2 (2016) (stating that a court should release a defendant 
on “personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond . . . unless the 
magistrate or court determines in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not 
reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required or that the defendant may pose a 
danger to any other person or to the community”).
194. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15(5) (West 2016) (When requiring that a judicial 
officer sets bail, “[t]he future safety of a victim of the alleged offense and the community shall be 
considered”). 
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Utah,195 Virginia,196 Washington,197 and Wyoming.198
In addition to taking into consideration “the nature and seriousness of 
the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the 
person’s release,”199 New Mexico takes a more narrow and unique 
approach to the issue of dangerousness by giving the court the option of 
refusing to allow the complaining witness or alleged victim to post bond 
for a defendant.200
Wisconsin permits monetary conditions of release to ensure a 
defendant’s appearance in court but not to protect members of the 
community.201 If the court finds that a defendant is a threat to the 
community, then other conditions of release can be imposed.202
Wisconsin also requires that an initial decision to deny release based on 
allegations “that available conditions of release will not adequately 
protect members of the community from serious bodily harm or prevent 
the intimidation of witnesses”203 be followed by, just as in federal court, 
a “pretrial detention hearing” where the defendant has “the right of 
confrontation, right to call witnesses, right to cross-examination and right 
to representation by counsel.”204
Washington has a similar statutory scheme where defendants are 
entitled to a hearing “to determine whether any condition or combination 
of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and 
                                                                                                                     
195. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-20-1(3)(d) (West 2016) (stating that a magistrate may impose 
conditions that will reasonably “ensure the safety of the public”).
196. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-120(A)(2) (2016) (stating that a person should be admitted to 
bail unless “[h]is liberty will constitute an unreasonable danger to himself or the public”).
197. WASH. CRIM. R. CTS. LTD. JURIS. 3.2(d) (stating that a court may impose restriction on 
a defendant’s liberty “[u]pon a showing that there exists a substantial danger that the accused will 
commit a violent crime or that the accused will seek to intimidate witnesses, or otherwise 
unlawfully interfere with the administration of justice”).
198. WYO. R. CRIM. P. 46.1(b) (stating that a court should release a defendant on personal 
recognizance or an unsecured bond “unless the judicial officer determines that such release will 
not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any 
other person or the community”).
199. N.M. R. CRIM. P. 6-401(B)(4).
200. Id. 6-401(A) (“If the court finds that the defendant poses a danger to the complaining 
witness or alleged victim, the court may refuse to allow the complaining witness or alleged victim 
to post bond for the defendant. This rule does not prevent the use of community funds to post a 
bond.”).
201. WIS. STAT. § 969.01(4) (2016) (“If bail is imposed, it shall be only in the amount found 
necessary to assure the appearance of the defendant.”).
202. Id. (“Conditions of release, other than monetary conditions, may be imposed for the 
purpose of protecting members of the community from serious bodily harm or preventing 
intimidation of witnesses.”).
203. Id. § 969.035(3)(c).
204. Id. § 969.035(6)(c).
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the community,”205 and at that hearing they have “the right to be 
represented by counsel, and, if financially unable to obtain representation, 
to have counsel appointed . . . [and] must be afforded an opportunity to 
testify, to present witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses who appear at 
the hearing, and to present information by proffer or otherwise.”206
There are, however, a few states that reject the idea that the potential 
dangerousness of the defendant should be a factor in setting bail and 
maintain that the only permissible reason to impose bail is to ensure the 
return of the defendant to court.207
4.  Reliance on Bail Schedules
Bail schedules are procedural schemes that provide judges with 
standardized money bail amounts based upon the offense charged, 
without taking into consideration the characteristics of an individual 
defendant.208 Nineteen states continue to use bail schedules for certain 
                                                                                                                     
205. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.21.060(1) (2016).
206. Id. § 10.21.060(3).
207. See ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 7.2(a) (“Any person charged with an offense bailable as a matter 
of right shall be released pending or during trial on the person’s own recognizance, unless the 
court determines, in its discretion, that such a release will not reasonably assure the person’s 
appearance as required.”); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 9.2(a) (“The judicial officer shall set money bail only 
after he determines that no other conditions will reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant 
in court.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-63b(b) (2016) (“The Court Support Services Division shall 
establish written uniform weighted release criteria based upon the premise that the least restrictive 
condition or conditions of release necessary to ensure the appearance in court of the defendant 
and sufficient to reasonably ensure the safety of any other person will not be endangered is the 
pretrial release alternative of choice.”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 185/7(b)(1)–(2) (2016) (requiring 
that pretrial service agencies take into consideration “the need for financial security to assure the 
defendant’s appearance at later proceedings; and appropriate conditions which shall be imposed 
to protect against the risks of nonappearance and commission of new offenses or other interference 
with the orderly administration of justice before trial”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 58 (2016) 
(“A justice or a clerk or assistant clerk of the district court, a bail commissioner . . . shall . . . hold 
a hearing in which the defendant and his counsel, if any, may participate and inquire into the case 
and shall admit such person to bail on his personal recognizance without surety unless said justice, 
clerk or assistant clerk, bail commissioner or master in chancery determines, in the exercise of his 
discretion, that such a release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person before the 
court.”); MASS R. GOVERNING PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMIT TO BAIL OUT OF CT. 3 (“The 
purpose of setting terms for any pre-trial release is to assure the presence at court of the person 
released.”); Royalty v. State, 235 So. 2d 718, 720 (Miss. 1970) (holding that “[s]ince the purpose 
of allowing bail is to secure the presence of the accused at trial, the amount of bail to be required 
is governed largely by the character of the offense committed and the financial ability of the 
accused”); State v. Steele, 61 A.3d 174, 181 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (holding that 
“[m]oney bail may not be used to protect the community by preventing release”).
208. Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion?, A.B.A CRIM.
JUST., Spring 2011, at 12, 13.
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offenses: Alabama,209 Alaska,210 California,211 Colorado,212 Georgia,213
Idaho,214 Iowa,215 Kentucky,216 Montana,217 Nebraska,218 Nevada,219
                                                                                                                     
209. ALA. R. CRIM. P. 7.2(b) (establishing a “general guide for circuit, district, and municipal 
courts in setting bail”).
210. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 41. 
211. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1269b(c) (West 2016).
212. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-103(4)(b) (2016) (“To the extent a court uses a bond 
schedule, the court shall incorporate into the bond schedule conditions of release and factors that 
consider the individualized risk and circumstances of a person in custody and all other relevant 
criteria and not solely the level of offense . . . .”).
213. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1(f)(1) (2016) (“[T]he judge of any court of inquiry may by 
written order establish a schedule of bails and unless otherwise ordered by the judge of any court, 
a person charged with committing any offense shall be released from custody upon posting bail 
as fixed in the schedule.”).
214. IDAHO MISD. CRIM. R. 13(a) (“The amount of bail for misdemeanor traffic offenses and 
other criminal offenses shall be as set forth herein. Such bail schedules shall not govern when a 
person charged appears before a judge or magistrate, or the defendant’s case is reviewed by a
judge or magistrate, in which case such bail schedules are advisory only and bail may be raised, 
lowered or eliminated at the magistrate’s discretion based upon the circumstances of that 
particular case. Any judge may also designate a bond schedule for offenses not listed below.”).
215. IOWA CODE § 804.21(5)(a) (West 2016) (“The judicial council shall promulgate rules 
and bond levels to be contained within a bond schedule for the release of an arrested person.”).
216. KY. R. CRIM. P. 4.20(1) (“The defendant may execute a bail bond in accordance with 
the uniform schedule of bail . . . for designated nonviolent Class D felonies, misdemeanors and 
violations without appearing before a judge.”).
217. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-9-302(1) (2015) (“A judge may establish and post a schedule 
of bail for offenses over which the judge has original jurisdiction.”).
218. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-901.05(1) (2016) (“It shall be the duty of the judges of the county 
court in each county to prepare and adopt, by a majority vote, a schedule of bail for all 
misdemeanor offenses and such other offenses as the judges deem necessary. It shall contain a list 
of such offenses and the amounts of bail applicable thereto as the judges determine to be 
appropriate.”).
219. NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.484(7) (2016) (mandating the amount of bail, at least three 
thousand and up to fifteen thousand dollars, for certain domestic violence offenses if a defendant 
does not personally appear before a judicial officer).
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New Jersey,220 New Mexico,221 Ohio,222 Oklahoma,223 Tennessee,224
Utah,225 Wisconsin,226 and Wyoming.227
In addition to the continued use of bail schedules, some jurisdictions 
authorize judicial officers to predetermine the amount of bail when 
issuing an arrest warrant. In these states, bail can be set at the time a 
judicial officer determines there is probable cause for an arrest, outside 
of the defendant’s presence. Twenty states permit the amount of bail to 
                                                                                                                     
220. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-12 (West 2016) (setting out “[c]rimes with bail restrictions”); 
State v. Steele, 61 A.3d 174, 182 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). New Jersey courts “are guided 
by bail schedules to promote uniformity” that “suggest ranges of bail for specific offenses.” Steele,
61 A.3d at 182.
221. In re Rodella, 190 P.3d 338, 348 (N.M. 2008) (mentioning the use of bond schedules 
and finding that deviation from a set schedule did not amount to willful misconduct).
222. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 46(G). In Ohio, the law requires each court to “establish a bail bond 
schedule covering all misdemeanors including traffic offenses, either specifically, by type, by 
potential penalty, or by some other reasonable method of classification.” Id.
223. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1105.2(B) (2016). “Every judicial district may, upon the order of 
the presiding judge for the district, establish a pretrial bail schedule for felony or misdemeanor 
offenses . . . .” Id.
224. Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 05-018 (Feb. 4, 2005) (stating that “a defendant is entitled to 
an individual determination of bond,” regardless of the manner of the arrest, but a jailer may not 
release a defendant by using a preset bond schedule published by the judges of the jurisdiction 
when a judge or clerk is not readily available).
225. UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(3)(B) (“The bail determination shall coincide with the 
recommended bail amount in the Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule unless the magistrate finds 
substantial cause to deviate from the Schedule.”).
226. WIS. STAT. § 969.065 (2016) (requiring the Wisconsin Judicial Conference to “develop 
guidelines for cash bail for persons accused of misdemeanors,” and those guidelines “shall relate 
primarily to individuals,” as opposed to the charge); STATE OF WIS., UNIFORM MISDEMEANOR 
BAIL SCHEDULE 77–78 (2016), https://www.wicourts.gov/publications/fees/docs/
bondsched16.pdf (stating if a defendant lacks proper identification, has insufficient ties to the 
community, or has previously failed to appear, then the Wisconsin Uniform Misdemeanor Bail 
Schedule lists the amount of cash bail that should be imposed without taking into consideration 
the defendant’s financial resources); see also Demmith v. Wis. Judicial Conference, 480 N.W.2d 
502, 507–08, 511–12 (Wis. 1992) (finding that the statutory requirement does not violate the 
separation of powers doctrine, but that the schedule failed to comply with the statute because it 
did “not consider factors which are directly related to an individual’s likelihood to appear in 
court”).
227. WYO. R. CRIM. P. 3.1 app. 1. “To ensure uniformity throughout the state,” Wyoming 
uses a bail schedule established by the Wyoming Supreme Court “for misdemeanor offenses for 
which bond may be posted and forfeited.” Id.
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be affixed to an arrest warrant: Alabama,228 California,229 Colorado,230
Idaho,231 Iowa,232 Kansas,233 Kentucky,234 Louisiana,235 Maine,236
Michigan,237 Minnesota,238 Montana,239 North Dakota,240 Ohio,241
                                                                                                                     
228. ALA. R. CRIM. P. 3.2(a) (“If the defendant is bailable as a matter of right, the arrest 
warrant may state the conditions of the defendant’s release on his or her own recognizance . . . or 
an amount of an appearance bond or a secured appearance bond predetermined by the court.”).
229. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1269(b) (West 2016) (“If a defendant has appeared before a judge 
of the court on the charge contained in the complaint, indictment, or information, the bail shall be 
in the amount fixed by the judge at the time of the appearance. If that appearance has not been 
made, the bail shall be in the amount fixed in the warrant of arrest . . . .”).
230. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-103(2) (2016) (“If an indictment, information, or complaint 
has been filed and the type of bond and conditions of release have been fixed upon return of the 
indictment or filing of the information or complaint, the court shall review the propriety of the 
type of bond and conditions of release upon first appearance of a person in custody.”).
231. IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 5(e) (“Upon advising the defendant of the above rights, the magistrate 
shall set bail for the defendant, and in the event the arrest is pursuant to a warrant, said bail shall 
be in the amount endorsed upon the warrant unless the magistrate finds good cause to alter the 
amount of the bail.”).
232. IOWA CODE § 804.3 (2016) (“If the offense stated in the warrant be bailable, the 
magistrate issuing it must make an endorsement thereon as follows: Let the defendant, when 
arrested, be (admitted to bail in the sum of ............ dollars) or (stating other conditions of 
release).”).
233. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2304(a) (2015) (“The amount of the appearance bond to be 
required shall be stated in the warrant.”).
234. KY. R. CRIM. P. 2.06(3) (“If the offense charged is bailable, the judge issuing a warrant 
of arrest shall fix the amount of bail and type of security, if any, and endorse it on the warrant.”).
235. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 203 (2016) (“The warrant of arrest may specify the 
amount of bail in noncapital cases when the magistrate has authority to fix bail.”).
236. ME. R. CRIM. P. 4(d)(1) (“The amount of bail may be fixed by the court and physically 
or electronically endorsed on the warrant.”).
237. MICH. R. CRIM. P. 6.102(D) (“[T]he court may specify on the warrant the bail that an 
accused may post to obtain release before arraignment on the warrant . . . .”).
238. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 3.02(1) (requiring that when issuing a warrant, “[f]or all offenses, the 
amount of bail must be set, and other conditions of release may be set, by a judge and stated on 
the warrant”).
239. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-214(2) (2015) (“The arrest warrant may specify the amount 
of bail.”).
240. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 4(b)(1) (“The warrant may also have endorsed upon it the 
recommended or acceptable amount of bail if the offense is bailable.”).
241. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 4(C)(1)(a). If “the defendant has [already] made an initial appearance 
or has failed to appear at an initial appearance,” the warrant must indicate the amount of cash or 
secured bail bond. Id.
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Oklahoma,242 Oregon,243 Rhode Island,244 South Dakota,245 Utah,246 and 
Wisconsin.247
5.  Additional Conditions of Release and the Lack of Pretrial Services
To assist the judge or magistrate in making a bail determination, some 
jurisdictions have created pretrial service agencies to interview 
defendants prior to their initial appearance.248 These interviews typically 
                                                                                                                     
242. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 173 (2016) (“The warrant must . . . state an offense . . . and if the 
offense charged is bailable, shall fix the amount of bail and an endorsement shall be made on the 
warrant, to the following effect: ‘The defendant is to be admitted to bail in the sum of $______.’ 
and be signed by the magistrate with his name of office.”).
243. OR. REV. STAT. § 133.140(8) (2015) (“A warrant of arrest shall: Specify the amount of 
security for release.”).
244. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 4(b)(1) (“The judge or other officer issuing a warrant may 
endorse upon it the amount of bail if the offense is bailable by that judge or officer.”).
245. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-2-4 (2016) (“The committing magistrate who signs the 
warrant shall also endorse the amount of bail on it.”).
246. UTAH R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (“When a warrant of arrest is issued, the judge shall state on 
the warrant: The conditions of pretrial release the court requires of the defendant, including 
monetary bail.”).
247. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 969.05(1)–(2) (2015) (“In misdemeanor actions, the judge who 
issues a warrant may endorse upon the warrant the amount of bail. The amount and method of 
posting bail may be endorsed upon felony warrants.”).
248. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1318.1(a) (West 2016) (“A court, with the concurrence of the 
board of supervisors, may employ an investigative staff for the purpose of recommending whether 
a defendant should be released on his or her own recognizance.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-
106(1) (2016) (“The chief judge of any judicial district may order a person who is eligible for 
bond or other pretrial release to be evaluated by a pretrial services program established pursuant 
to this section, which program may advise the court if the person is bond eligible, may provide 
information that enables the court to make an appropriate decision on bond and conditions of 
release, and may recommend conditions of release consistent with this section.”); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 54-63b(a)(1) (2016) (“The duties of the Court Support Services Division shall include: 
To promptly interview, prior to arraignment, any person referred by the police . . . or by a judge. 
Such interview shall include, but not be limited to, information concerning the accused person, 
his or her family, community ties, prior criminal record and physical and mental condition.”); 725 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 185/1 (West 2016) (“Each circuit court shall establish a pretrial services agency 
to provide the court with accurate background data regarding the pretrial release of persons 
charged with felonies and effective supervision of compliance with the terms and conditions 
imposed on release.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-909 (2016) (“The district courts of this state are 
authorized to designate an official pretrial release agency for a district, or for any county within a 
district, whenever the court is satisfied that such agency can render competent and effective 
assistance to the court in making its determination of the terms and conditions under which any 
court should release a prisoner from jail prior to trial.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.235(2)–(3) (2016) 
(“The release assistance officer shall, except when impracticable, interview every person detained 
pursuant to law and charged with an offense [and] shall verify release criteria information . . . .”); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-152.4:3(A)(2) (2016); KY. R. CRIM. P. 4.06 (“The duties of a pretrial 
services agency authorized by the Administrative Office of the Courts to serve the trial court shall 
include interviewing defendants eligible for pretrial release, verifying information obtained from 
31
Gross: The Right To Counsel But Not The Presence of Counsel: A Survey of
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
862 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
focus on the defendant’s work history, financial resources, ties to the 
community, and criminal record.
Despite the fact that the American Bar Association has taken the 
position that “[e]very jurisdiction should establish a pretrial services 
agency or program to collect and present the necessary information, 
present risk assessments, and, consistent with court policy, make release 
recommendations required by the judicial officer in making release 
decisions,”249 states do not always require local jurisdictions to have 
pretrial release programs.250
Electronic home monitoring is one increasingly popular condition of 
release, although states typically require defendants to pay the costs 
associated with it, often directly to the private agency responsible for 
providing the service.251
                                                                                                                     
defendants, making recommendations to the court as to whether defendants interviewed should 
be released on personal recognizance, identifying veterans, and any other duties ordered by the 
Supreme Court.”); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 7(a)(3) (“On the day of the arraignment, the probation 
department shall interview the defendant; the probation department shall report to the court the 
pertinent information reasonably necessary to determine the issues of bail and indigency.”); MINN.
R. CRIM. P. 6.02(3) (“To determine conditions of release, the court may investigate the defendant’s 
background before or at the defendant’s court appearance. The investigation may be conducted 
by probation services or by any other qualified agency as directed by the court.”). Local pretrial 
services officers shall “[p]resent a pretrial investigation report with recommendations to assist 
courts in discharging their duties related to granting or reconsidering bail.” VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
152.4:3(A)(2).
249. Criminal Justice Section Standards: Pretrial Release, A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_
pretrialrelease_blk.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).
250. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-535(b) (2016) (“In any county in which there is a pretrial 
release program, the senior resident superior court judge may, after consultation with the chief 
district court judge, order that defendants accepted by such program for supervision shall, with 
their consent, be released by judicial officials to supervision of such programs . . . .”); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 22, § 1105.3(A) (2016), amended by 2016 Okla. Sess. Laws 3 (“Any county pursuant to 
the provisions of this act may establish and fund a pretrial program to be utilized by the district 
court in that jurisdiction.”).
251. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1.1(a), (h)(1) (2016) (authorizing the use of an “electronic 
pretrial release and monitoring program” and requiring a defendant in such a program to “pay a 
reasonable, nonrefundable fee for program enrollment, equipment use, and monitoring to the 
provider of such program”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 5-201(b)(1)–(2) (West 2016) 
(permitting the court, as a condition of pretrial release, to require monitoring of the defendant by 
a private home detention monitoring agency and requiring the defendant to pay the agency’s 
monitoring fee); MO. REV. STAT. § 544.455(1)(6) (2016) (permitting a judge to “[p]lace the person 
on house arrest with electronic monitoring; except that all costs associated with the electronic 
monitoring shall be charged to the person on house arrest”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534(a)(5) 
(2016) (“In determining conditions of pretrial release a judicial official must impose at least one 
of the following conditions: House arrest with electronic monitoring.”); OHIO CRIM. R. 46(B)(3) 
(“The court may . . . [p]lace the person under a house arrest, electronic monitoring, or work release 
program.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1105.2(F)–(G) (West 2016), amended by 2016 Okla. Sess. 
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6.  The Use of Evidence Based Risk Assessment Tools
Some courts have also started using an evidence based risk assessment 
tool as part of the bail determination.252 Evidence based pretrial risk 
assessment tools measure the risk that a defendant, if released pending 
trial, will fail to appear for a court date or will commit a new crime. 
It is estimated that only about 10% of judicial officers across the 
country use pretrial risk assessment tools to make release decisions, in 
part because they require costly and time-consuming interviews with 
defendants.253 Only three states, Kentucky, Ohio, and Virginia, have 
created and validated a state-specific risk assessment instrument for use 
by pretrial services agencies across the entire state.254
                                                                                                                     
Laws ch. 59 (“The court may require the person to be placed on an electronic monitoring device 
as a condition of pretrial release [and] may impose payment of a supervision fee [which] shall be 
a condition of pretrial release . . . .”);; see also Erik Markowitz, Chain Gang 2.0: If You Can’t 
Afford This GPS Ankle Bracelet, You Get Thrown in Jail, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/chain-gang-20-if-you-cant-afford-gps-ankle-bracelet-you-get-thrown-
jail-2065283 (finding that Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Washington all 
contract with private, for-profit companies requiring individuals to pay for their own tracking). 
252. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-103(3)(b) (2016) (“In determining the type of bond and 
conditions of release, if practicable and available in the jurisdiction, the court shall use an 
empirically developed risk assessment instrument designed to improve pretrial release decisions 
by providing to the court information that classifies a person in custody based upon predicted 
level of risk of pretrial failure.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-63b(b) (2016) (“The Court Support 
Services Division shall establish written uniform weighted release criteria . . . .”); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11, § 2104(d) (2016) (“In making a release determination, or imposing conditions set 
forth in § 2108 of this title, the court shall employ an objective risk assessment instrument to 
gauge the person’s risk of flight and re-arrest and the safety of the victim and the community.”); 
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 185/20 (2016) (“In preparing and presenting its written reports . . . pretrial 
services agencies shall in appropriate cases include specific recommendations for the setting, 
increase, or decrease of bail; the release of the interviewee on his own recognizance in sums 
certain; and the imposition of pretrial conditions to bail or recognizance . . . . In establishing 
objective internal criteria of any such recommendation policies, the agency may utilize so-called 
‘point scales’ for evaluating the aforementioned risks, but no interviewee shall be considered as 
ineligible for particular agency recommendations by sole reference to such procedures.”); UTAH 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, UNIFORM FINE/BAIL FORFEITURE SCHEDULE 4 (2016), 
https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/append/c_fineba/FineBail_Schedule.pdf (utilizing 
a “criminal history assessment” based on prior convictions and previous levels of supervision in 
determining the amount of bail to be set).
253. MARIE VANNOSTRAND & CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD 
FOUND., ASSESSING PRETRIAL RISK WITHOUT A DEFENDANT INTERVIEW 3 (2013),
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_no-interview_
FNL.pdf. 
254. CYNTHIA A. MAMALIAN, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF PRETRIAL 
RISK ASSESSMENT 19 (2011), http://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/PJI%20State%
20of%20the%20Science%20Pretrial%20Risk%20Assessment%20(2011).pdf.
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II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Supreme Court has made it very clear that “[t]he Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attaches at the first formal proceeding 
against an accused.”255 What is less clear is when counsel must actually 
be present.256
In Coleman v. Alabama,257 the Supreme Court found that an indigent 
defendant had a right to counsel at a preliminary hearing.258 The Court 
found that a number of factors made the presence of counsel necessary:
First, the lawyer’s skilled examination and cross-
examination of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in 
the State’s case that may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind 
the accused over. Second, in any event, the skilled 
interrogation of witnesses by an experienced lawyer can 
fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-
examination of the State’s witnesses at the trial, or preserve 
testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who does not 
appear at the trial. Third, trained counsel can more 
effectively discover the case the State has against his client 
and make possible the preparation of a proper defense to 
meet that case at the trial. Fourth, counsel can also be 
influential at the preliminary hearing in making effective 
arguments for the accused on such matters as the necessity 
for an early psychiatric examination or bail.259
The Court’s reference to the ability of counsel to make an “effective 
argument” regarding bail supports the argument that where an initial 
appearance includes a bail determination, it would require the actual 
presence of counsel to assist the defendant.
However, the Court’s holding in Gerstein v. Pugh260 undermines that 
argument. In Gerstein, the Court held that a judicial officer must make a 
prompt determination regarding probable cause for a warrantless arrest 
but “[b]ecause of its limited function and its nonadversary character, the 
probable cause determination is not a ‘critical stage’ in the prosecution 
that would require appointed counsel.”261 It is important to note that 
                                                                                                                     
255. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 203 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting 
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 180–81 (1991)).
256. Id. at 213–14 (Alito, J., concurring) (“As I interpret our precedents, the term 
‘attachment’ signifies nothing more than the beginning of the defendant’s prosecution. It does not 
mark the beginning of a substantive entitlement to the assistance of counsel.”).
257. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
258. Id. at 9–10. 
259. Id. at 9.
260. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
261. Id. at 122, 125.
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Gerstein involved only a determination regarding probable cause, a 
determination identical to the one that takes place when a judicial officer 
issues an arrest warrant, a process that occurs outside of the presence of 
the defendant. The factors involved in making decisions regarding 
conditions of pretrial release are far more complex and focus on the 
characteristics of the defendant and, to a lesser extent, the allegations 
against the defendant. 
A. Trial-Like Confrontations
The Supreme Court has recognized that the “core purpose” of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the 
assistance of counsel at trial.262 At the same time, the Court has 
recognized that there are certain pretrial proceedings where a defendant 
may be “confronted, just as at trial, by the procedural system, or by his 
expert adversary, or by both.”263 The Court has also recognized that there 
are situations where the results of a pretrial confrontation “might well 
settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.”264
This has led the Court to conclude that indigent defendants are entitled 
to the presence of appointed counsel during any “critical stage” of the 
proceedings.265 The Court defines “critical stages” as “proceedings 
between an individual and agents of the State (whether ‘formal or 
informal, in court or out’) that amount to ‘trial-like confrontations,’ at 
which counsel would help the accused ‘in coping with legal problems 
or . . . meeting his adversary.’”266
In states where the judicial officer must consider the weight of the 
evidence against the accused or the likelihood of conviction when 
determining conditions of pretrial release, the initial appearance is clearly 
a trial-like confrontation. If a prosecutor happens to be present, or is able 
to communicate to the judicial officer the prosecutor’s position regarding 
                                                                                                                     
262. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973) (finding that “the core purpose of the 
counsel guarantee was to assure ‘Assistance’ at trial, when the accused was confronted with both 
the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor”).
263. Id. at 310.
264. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (finding that defendants have a right 
to counsel at a pretrial lineup).
265. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 212 (2008) (“Once attachment occurs, the 
accused at least is entitled to the presence of appointed counsel during any ‘critical stage’ of the 
post-attachment proceedings; what makes a stage critical is what shows the need for counsel’s 
presence. Thus, counsel must be appointed within a reasonable time after attachment to allow for 
adequate representation at any critical stage before trial, as well as at trial itself.” (footnotes 
omitted)).
266. Id. at 212 n.16 (citation omitted) (first quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 
226 (1967); and then quoting United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 312–13 (1973)).
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appropriate conditions of pretrial release, then it would seem equally 
clear that the accused would be entitled to the assistance of counsel.
B.  The Threat to Public Safety
In United States v. Salerno,267 the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. At issue in Salerno was 
whether the Due Process Clause prohibits pretrial detention on the ground 
that a defendant is a danger to the community.268 The Court found that 
the “[g]overnment’s regulatory interest in community safety can, in 
appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest.”269
While scholars have criticized the Court’s decision in Salerno for 
failing to appreciate the significance of the presumption of innocence,270
the Bail Reform Act of 1984 outlined specific procedures that needed to 
be followed before a defendant could be denied bail because the 
defendant was a threat to the safety of the community.271 As the Court 
noted, the Act was not “a scattershot attempt to incapacitate” defendants 
accused of serious crimes.272 The Court relied on the fact that following 
a judicial determination of probable cause, the defendant is entitled to “a 
full-blown adversary hearing, the Government must convince a neutral 
decision maker by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of 
release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any 
person.”273
While states have embraced the idea of preventative detention based 
on the perceived dangerousness of a defendant, state statutes that permit 
judicial officers to take the potential dangerousness of a defendant into 
consideration when determining conditions of pretrial release do not 
contain the same procedural protections as the Bail Reform Act of 1984. 
They are the type of “scattershot attempts” to incapacitate defendants 
solely based on the nature of the charge that the Supreme Court did not 
have to address in Salerno. Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 
defendants who are denied bail are entitled to a prompt hearing where 
they have a right to counsel.274 State statutes that permit a judicial officer 
to deny bail based on the perceived dangerousness of the defendant do 
                                                                                                                     
267. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
268. Id. at 755. 
269. Id. at 748.
270. See Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 
750 (2011); Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN.
L. REV. 335, 351–54 (1990).
271. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755. 
272. Id. at 750.
273. Id.
274. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2012).
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not typically afford the defendant the right to a hearing or the right to 
counsel. 
C.  Pretrial Events that Impact the Trial
Even if bail hearings in state court did not resemble trial-like 
confrontations, it is clear that pretrial incarceration adversely impacts the 
ultimate outcome for defendants. The Supreme Court has observed that 
the “traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the 
unhampered preparation of a defense.”275 The Court has acknowledged 
that “if a defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his ability to gather 
evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense.”276 The 
Court has also recognized that the time between a defendant’s 
arraignment and the beginning of trial is a “critical period of the 
proceedings . . . when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and 
preparation” are of vital importance.277
Recent empirical studies demonstrate the adverse impacts of pretrial 
incarceration. One study found that defendants characterized as low-risk
who were detained pretrial were over five times more likely to be 
sentenced to jail and over three times more likely to be sentenced to 
prison than defendants who were released at some point pending trial.278
The same study also found that defendants characterized as moderate or 
high risk who were not released before trial or disposition were three 
times more likely to be sentenced to jail or prison than defendants who 
were released and all defendants who were detained pretrial, regardless 
of classification as low or high risk, received longer jail and prison 
sentences than defendants who were released.279
Even if the Court views the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as a 
right designed to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial, the 
obstacles that defendants who are incarcerated face when attempting to 
prepare a defense arguably impacts the fairness of their trial and, in some 
cases, may exert pressure on them to waive their right to trial and plead 
guilty. The fact that defendants who are incarcerated have worse case 
outcomes suggests that pretrial incarceration impacts the fairness of the 
adjudication process. 
                                                                                                                     
275. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
276. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972); see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining 
Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2493 (2004) (noting that “[d]etained 
defendants find it harder to meet and strategize with their lawyers and to track down witnesses”).
277. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
278. CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., INVESTIGATING 
THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION ON SENTENCING OUTCOMES 4 (2013),
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_state-sentencing_
FNL.pdf.
279. Id.
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D. Actual Incarceration
In Gideon v. Wainwright,280 the Supreme Court recognized the 
“obvious truth” that “in our adversary system of criminal justice, any 
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be 
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”281 While the 
Court’s decision in Gideon overturned a felony conviction, the language 
the Court used suggested that indigent defendants had a right to counsel 
in any criminal prosecution.282
In Argersinger v. Hamlin,283 the Court extended the right to counsel 
to indigent defendants charged with misdemeanors who were sentenced 
to incarceration.284 The Court would later clarify the Argersinger holding 
in Scott v. Illinois,285 “[W]e believe that the central premise of 
Argersinger—that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from 
fines or the mere threat of imprisonment—is eminently sound and 
warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the 
constitutional right to appointment of counsel.”286
While the Supreme Court does not regard pretrial incarceration as 
punitive, it is clear from Argersinger and Scott that the law requires 
counsel when a judge wishes to impose any amount of incarceration 
following a conviction. While the Court’s distinction between post-
adjudicative incarceration and pre-adjudicative incarceration is 
reasonable because of the collateral consequences of conviction,287 it
becomes less reasonable as the length of pretrial incarceration increases. 
One study estimates that the average length of pretrial confinement in 
2013 was twenty-three days, an increase from fourteen days in 1983.288
                                                                                                                     
280. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
281. Id. at 344.
282. Id. (“The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental 
and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state 
and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive 
safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands 
equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has 
to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.”).
283. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
284. Id. at 37. 
285. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
286. Id. at 373. 
287. See John P. Gross, What Matters More: A Day in Jail or a Criminal Conviction?, 22 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 55, 55 (2013).
288. RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR:
THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 10 (2015), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/
downloads/incarcerations-front-door-report.pdf. 
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E. Sentencing Hearings
Prior to the Court’s decision in Gideon, the Court had relied on the 
Due Process Clause of either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments when 
ruling that indigent defendants were entitled to the assistance of 
counsel.289 Following the Gideon decision, the Court clarified that these 
earlier cases “stand for the proposition that appointment of counsel for an 
indigent is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where 
substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected.”290 This includes 
the right to counsel at sentencing, even if the judge has very limited 
discretion in sentencing.291 The Court has recognized “the necessity for 
the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, introducing evidence of 
mitigating circumstances and in general aiding and assisting the 
defendant to present his case as to sentence.”292
Bail hearings, like sentencing hearings, offer the opportunity to 
present the same type of mitigating circumstances that may influence a 
judge’s ultimate decision regarding the terms and conditions of 
confinement. Consider a sentencing hearing where a judge had the option 
of imposing a sentence of probation with various conditions or a sentence 
of incarceration. In many ways, such a hearing mirrors the type of 
decisions made by a judge during a bail hearing, especially in 
jurisdictions where a judge must weigh any potential threat a defendant 
poses to the community or to an individual.
F.  Plea Bargaining
The idea that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to ensure the 
reliability of a conviction following trial is undermined by the fact that 
97% of federal convictions and 94% of state convictions are the result of 
guilty pleas.293 The Supreme Court has recognized that the current 
                                                                                                                     
289. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 52 (1961) (holding that the failure to appoint 
counsel at a defendant’s arraignment was a denial of due process since Alabama law required 
certain defense to be plead at arraignment); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161, 165 (1957) 
(finding a denial of due process when the defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive 
counsel before entering a guilty plea); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (holding 
that the absence of counsel at sentencing coupled with inaccurate assumptions about the 
defendant’s criminal record deprived the defendant of due process).
290. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
291. See id. at 135 (stating that the law requires counsel at sentencing even though judge was 
required to sentence the defendant to the maximum term provided by law and only makes a 
recommendation to the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles); see also Glover v. United States, 531 
U.S. 198, 204 (2001) (holding that defense counsel could be found to have provided ineffective 
assistance for failing to object to an error of law affecting the sentencing calculation even if the 
error did not result in a significant increase in the sentence).
292. Mempa, 389 U.S. at 135.
293. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012). 
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criminal justice system “is for the most part a system of pleas, not a 
system of trials.”294 The Court has described plea bargains as “central to 
the administration of the criminal justice system.”295 The Court also 
recognized the practical effect of a criminal justice system that relies 
almost exclusively on plea bargaining: “In today’s criminal justice 
system, therefore, the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the 
unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a defendant.”296
Pretrial incarceration plays a large role in plea bargaining, especially 
for defendants who are charged with misdemeanors and may be able to 
receive a sentence of time already served.297 In ruling that indigent 
defendants charged with misdemeanors have a right to counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court expressed concern over the 
prejudice that results from “assembly line justice.”298 In a criminal justice 
system where guilt is primarily adjudicated pretrial and where judicial 
officers are called upon to make predictive determinations regarding guilt 
at a defendant’s initial appearance, it makes sense to require the presence 
of counsel at that initial appearance.  
III. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The Supreme Court recognized that indigent defendants have a right 
to counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause in 
Powell v. Alabama,299 more than thirty years before the Court’s landmark 
decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, which granted indigent defendants the 
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.300 In Powell, the Court 
stated:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail 
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. 
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and 
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with 
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself 
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with 
                                                                                                                     
294. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).
295. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. “To a large extent . . . horse trading [between prosecutor and 
defense counsel] determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is. It 
is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” Id. (alteration 
in original) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
296. Id.
297. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2012) 
(describing the mechanics of the petty offense process and its disregard for the evidentiary 
checking mechanism of standard criminal practice).
298. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972).
299. 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932).
300. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 348 (1963).
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the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may 
be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon 
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or 
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and 
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though 
he [may] have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of 
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. 
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of 
conviction because he does not know how to establish his 
innocence.301
While an indigent defendant does not face the possibility of conviction 
at his initial appearance, the defendant still faces the possibility of pretrial 
incarceration. If the judicial officer charged with making the pretrial 
release decision must take into consideration the likelihood of conviction 
and the weight of the evidence against the defendant, the danger is that 
an indigent defendant who “lacks both the skill and knowledge 
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he ha[s] a perfect one”
will be subjected to pretrial incarceration.302 As the Court has said, it is 
an “obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the 
professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal 
with power to take his life or liberty. . . . That which is simple, orderly, 
and necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman may appear intricate, 
complex and mysterious.”303
A. The Need for Adequate Procedural Safeguards
Assuming that a defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial 
officer who has the power to restrict the defendant’s liberty is not a 
“critical stage” of the proceedings under the Sixth Amendment, the 
question remains what procedural protections are required under the Due 
Process Clause. When evaluating what procedures are required to ensure 
due process of law, the Supreme Court considers three distinct factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, 
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
                                                                                                                     
301. Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69.
302. See id. at 69. 
303. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938).
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additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.304
The Court has recognized that when evaluating the “private interest 
that will be affected,” an indigent defendant’s loss of personal liberty 
through imprisonment lies “at the core of the liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause.”305 At the same time, the Court has said that the concept 
of due process of law “is not a technical conception with a fixed content 
unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”306 The court has said that 
applying the Due Process Clause is “an uncertain enterprise” that requires 
discovering “what ‘fundamental fairness’ consists of in a particular 
situation by first considering any relevant precedents and then by 
assessing the several interests that are at stake.”307 With that in mind, the 
Court has ruled on which specific procedural protections are required 
before an indigent defendant can be deprived of her liberty during parole 
revocation hearings, probation revocation hearings, and civil contempt 
proceedings.
1.  Parole Revocation Hearings
In Morrissey v. Brewer,308 the Supreme Court considered what type 
of procedural protections parolees are entitled to at a parole revocation 
hearing.309 Since the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal 
prosecution, the Court ruled that “the full panoply of rights due a 
defendant in such a proceeding does not apply.”310 Nevertheless, the 
Court found that a parolee has a liberty interest that “must be seen as 
within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.”311 The court also 
noted that a parolee “is not the only one who has a stake in in his 
conditional liberty. Society has a stake in whatever may be the chance of 
restoring him to normal and useful life within the law.”312
In determining what process is due to a parolee facing revocation, the 
Court found that the typical process of parole revocation involved two 
important stages: the arrest of the parolee and the preliminary hearing 
                                                                                                                     
304. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
305. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 445 (2011) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 
80 (1992)).
306. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (quoting Joint 
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162–63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring)).
307. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1981).
308. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
309. Id. at 472. 
310. Id. at 480.
311. Id. at 482.
312. Id. at 484.
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followed by the revocation hearing.313 In terms of the arrest and 
preliminary hearing, the Court required that the parolee be given notice 
of the alleged violation; the opportunity to speak on his own behalf; the 
right to bring letters, documents, or individuals to testify before the 
hearing officer; and the right to question the person who gave the 
information on which the parole revocation is based.314 In addition, the 
law requires the hearing officer to make a summary or digest of what 
occurs at the hearing.315
2.  Probation Revocation Hearings
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli,316 the Supreme Court found that a 
“[p]robation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal 
prosecution, but does result in a loss of liberty.”317 Consequently, the 
Court found that a probationer “is entitled to a preliminary and a final 
revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. 
Brewer.”318 The Court of Appeals had held that a probationer was entitled 
to counsel at a revocation hearing, but the Supreme Court declined to 
adopt a rule requiring counsel in all such cases.319 Instead, the Court 
adopted a “case-by-case approach to the right to counsel” in probation 
and parole revocation hearings.320
The Court noted that “[b]oth the probationer or parolee and the State 
have interests in the accurate finding of fact and the informed use of 
discretion.” Specifically, these interests include the interests of “the 
probationer or parolee to insure that his liberty is not unjustifiably taken 
away and the State to make certain that it is neither unnecessarily 
interrupting a successful effort at rehabilitation nor imprudently 
prejudicing the safety of the community.”321 The Court also noted that 
the procedural protections set forth in Morrissey “serve as substantial 
protection against ill-considered revocation.”322 That being said, the 
Court was not convinced that probationers or parolees could always rely 
upon those procedural protections to guarantee their due process at a 
revocation hearing:
                                                                                                                     
313. Id. at 485–87. 
314. Id. at 486–87.
315. Id. at 487.
316. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
317. Id. at 782.
318. Id. The Court found “that the Court of Appeals erred in accepting respondent’s 
contention that the State is under a constitutional duty to provide counsel for indigents in all 
probation or parole revocation cases.” Id. at 787.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 788. 
321. Id. at 785.
322. Id. at 786.
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[T]he effectiveness of the rights guaranteed by Morrissey
may in some circumstances depend on the use of skills which 
the probationer or parolee is unlikely to possess. Despite the 
informal nature of the proceedings and the absence of 
technical rules of procedure or evidence, the unskilled or 
uneducated probationer or parolee may well have difficulty 
in presenting his version of a disputed set of facts where the 
presentation requires the examining or cross-examining of 
witnesses or the offering or dissecting of complex 
documentary evidence.323
The question of whether a parolee or probationer should be 
provided with counsel is therefore left up to the discretion of the 
judicial officer responsible for conducting a revocation hearing. At 
least in some cases, due process requires that a parolee or 
probationer be provided with counsel. 
Currently, the procedural protections afforded to parolees and 
probations at revocation hearings by the Supreme Court appear to 
be greater than those available to defendants during an initial 
appearance in state courts where judicial officers determine 
conditions of pretrial release. 
3.  Civil Contempt Proceedings
In Turner v. Rogers,324 the Supreme Court held that “the Due Process 
Clause does not automatically require the provision of counsel at civil 
contempt proceedings to an indigent individual who is subject to a child 
support order, even if that individual faces incarceration.”325 In deciding 
that due process did not require counsel, the Court relied on three 
factors.326
First, “the critical question likely at issue in these cases 
concerns . . . the defendant’s ability to pay,” which “is often closely 
related to the question of the defendant’s indigence.”327 Second, counsel 
is unlikely to represent the opposing party.328 Third, there are ‘“substitute 
procedural safeguards”’ that “can significantly reduce the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of liberty.”329
                                                                                                                     
323. Id. at 786–87.
324. 564 U.S. 431 (2011).
325. Id. at 448.
326. Id. at 446. 
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 447 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
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Those safeguards include (1) notice to the defendant that his 
‘ability to pay’ is a critical issue in the contempt proceeding; 
(2) the use of a form (or the equivalent) to elicit relevant 
financial information; (3) an opportunity at the hearing for 
the defendant to respond to statements and questions about 
his financial status (e.g., those triggered by his responses on 
the form); and (4) an express finding by the court that the 
defendant has the ability to pay.330
There are aspects of the Court’s holding in Turner that are applicable 
to bail hearings. First, the court’s conclusion that a determination of an 
individual’s financial resources, of their ability to pay, can be 
accomplished without the aid of counsel supports the argument that due 
process does not require counsel in order to determine if a defendant in a 
criminal case is indigent. Second, since the Court relied, at least in part, 
on the absence of opposing counsel when holding that due process does 
not require counsel in Turner, the presence of a prosecutor at a 
defendant’s initial appearance would seem to necessitate the presence of 
defense counsel. Third, assuming counsel is not required at a defendant’s 
initial appearance, due process requires alternative procedural safeguards
similar to those the Court identified in Turner.
4.  Objective Pretrial Risk Assessments
One question that arises is whether objective pretrial risk assessments 
can be the kind of “alternative procedural safeguards” called for in 
Turner. Pretrial risk assessment is an attempt to identify factors that are 
predictive of pretrial misconduct including a defendant’s prior failures to 
appear, arrest record, and other factors that indicate a likelihood that the 
defendant will reoffend.331 When evaluating these factors, a point scale 
assigns a certain number of points for specific factors that have some 
correlation to pretrial misconduct.332 The resulting score is then used to 
categorize a defendant as a low, moderate, or high risk for failure to 
appear or to commit another offense.333
While some states have adopted evidence based pretrial risk 
assessments,334 it is important to understand what factors those 
instruments take into consideration. A survey of existing studies 
identified six validated pretrial risk factors: (1) prior failure to appear; (2)
prior convictions; (3) present charge a felony; (4) being unemployed; (5) 
                                                                                                                     
330. Id. at 447–48.
331. See MAMALIAN, supra note 254, at 7.
332. Id. at 7–8. 
333. Id. at 18. 
334. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
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history of drug abuse; and (6) having a pending case.335 None of these 
factors take into account the likelihood of conviction, the weight of the 
evidence against a defendant, or potential defense. Four of the factors—
prior failures to appear, prior convictions, the fact that the present charge 
is a felony, and the existence of a pending case—all deal with a 
defendant’s prior criminal record. The use of employment status as a risk 
factor may increase the likelihood of bail being set for an indigent 
defendant since defendants classified as indigent are more likely to be 
unemployed. Without consideration of additional factors, pretrial risk 
assessments can resemble bail schedules.336
Another concern is the extent to which a pretrial risk assessment has 
been validated. A survey by the Pretrial Justice Institute found that of 
those pretrial programs that do risk assessment, only 42% report having 
developed their risk assessment procedures based on research done in 
their own jurisdictions.337 The same survey found that 48% of pretrial 
programs have never validated their pretrial risk assessment instruments 
and also found that there is no standard method pretrial programs use for 
validation.338 So while there is certainly evidence that objective, validated 
pretrial risk assessment instruments can assist judicial officers in making 
pretrial release decisions, they cannot replace the procedural safeguards 
called for in cases like Morrissey, Gagnon, and Turner.
5.  The Role of an Advocate
It is possible for a judge or magistrate to conduct a bail hearing in such 
a way as to minimize the disadvantages an indigent defendant suffers 
because the defendant is unrepresented. If a pretrial services agency 
provided the hearing officer with detailed information about the 
defendant, and the hearing officer thoroughly reviewed the allegations 
against the defendant, with an eye toward identifying potential defenses 
and potential weaknesses in the prosecution’s case, it might minimize the 
prejudice to an indigent defendant. However, this type of examination 
without advocacy is not an adequate substitute for counsel. 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Douglas v. California339 illustrates 
this point. In Douglas, the Court found that indigent appellants have a 
right to counsel despite the fact that the law required appellate court 
                                                                                                                     
335. MAMALIAN, supra note 254, at 9.
336. See VANNOSTRAND & LOWENKAMP, supra note 253, at 20 (concluding that one can 
conduct accurate pretrial risk assessments without interviewing defendants).
337. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., 2009 SURVEY OF PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS 37 (2009), 
http://www.pretrial.org/download/pji-reports/new-PJI%202009%20Survey%20of%20Pretrial%
20Services%20Programs.pdf. 
338. Id. at 63.
339. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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judges to make an independent investigation of the record to determine if 
the appointment of counsel would be to the advantage of the appellant or 
the court and should deny the appointment of counsel only if such 
appointment would be of no value to the appellant or the court.340 The 
Court found that despite the opportunity for judicial review, “the type of 
an appeal a person is afforded . . . hinges upon whether or not he can pay 
for the assistance of counsel.”341
The ability of the appellant to hire counsel would result in judicial 
review “after having the full benefit of written briefs and oral argument 
by counsel,” but “only the barren record speaks for the indigent, and, 
unless the printed pages show that an injustice has been committed, he is 
forced to go without a champion on appeal.”342 The Court found that there 
was enough of a difference between an “ex parte examination of the 
record”343 by a judge and the advocacy that counsel could provide that 
the failure to appoint counsel was a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
The Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion regarding a judge’s 
ability to be an advocate for a defendant during trial in Powell v. 
Alabama.344 The Court noted that a judge “can and should see to it that 
in the proceedings before the court the accused shall be dealt with justly 
and fairly,” but a judge “cannot investigate the facts, advise and direct the 
defense, or participate in those necessary conferences between counsel 
and accused which sometimes partake of the inviolable character of the 
confessional.”345 The Court reached the same conclusion in Carnley v. 
Cochran346 when it ruled that “the trial judge could not effectively 
discharge the roles of both judge and defense counsel.”347
The criminal defense bar also recognizes the critical role that counsel 
plays at the initial appearance where a judicial officer sets bail.348 The 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers has adopted a 
resolution calling for “counsel at the first appearance before a judicial 
officer at which liberty is at stake or at which a plea of guilty to any 
                                                                                                                     
340. Id. at 355.
341. Id. at 355–56.
342. Id. at 356.
343. Id. (emphasis omitted).
344. 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932)
345. Id.
346. 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
347. Id. at 510.
348. See Clara Kalhous & John Meringolo, Bail Pending Trial: Changing Interpretations of 
the Bail Reform Act and the Importance of Bail from Defense Attorneys’ Perspectives, 32 PACE 
L. REV. 800, 801 (2012).
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criminal charge may be entered.”349 The Oregon Office of Public Defense 
Services recommends that defense providers “should ensure that an 
attorney is present at the first appearance in court of any person who may 
be entitled to representation by appointed counsel at state expense, 
including the initial arraignment in criminal cases.”350
The Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy produced a ninety-
four-page Pretrial Release Manual351 to assist assigned counsel in 
litigating issues surrounding pretrial release. The Colorado State Public 
Defender also publishes a seventy-eight-page Bail Book352 for identical 
reasons. In addition, empirical data also shows that representation at a 
bail hearing makes a substantial difference in judicial outcomes.353
                                                                                                                     
349. Resolution of the Board of Directors of the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers on Right to Counsel at Initial Appearance Before a Judicial Officer at Which Liberty Is
at Stake or at Which a Plea of Guilty to Any Criminal Charge May Be Entered, NAT’L ASS’N
CRIM. DEF. LAWS (Feb. 19, 2012), http://www.nacdl.org/resolutions/2012mm1/. But see Criminal 
Justice Section Standards: Pretrial Release, supra note 249 (stating at the first appearance, the 
judicial officer should inform a defendant that the defendant “has a right to counsel in future 
proceedings, and that if the defendant cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed”).
350. STATE OF OR., OFFICE OF PUB. DEF. SERVS., BEST PRACTICES FOR OREGON PUBLIC 
DEFENSE PROVIDERS 12 (2010), https://www.oregon.gov/OPDS/docs/Reports/BestPractices 
March2010Revision.pdf. But see N.C. COMM’N ON INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., PERFORMANCE 
GUIDELINES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE REPRESENTATION IN NON-CAPITAL CRIMINAL CASES AT THE 
TRIAL LEVEL 4 (2004), http://www.ncids.org/Rules%20&%20Procedures/Performance% 
20Guidelines/Trial%20Level%20Final%20Performance%20Guidelines.pdf (advising attorneys 
that “[a]s soon as possible after appointment, where the client has not been able to obtain pretrial 
release, counsel should consider filing a motion to reduce bond or otherwise modify any pretrial 
release conditions that were set by the magistrate or other judicial official at the client’s initial 
appearance”); N.D. COMM’N ON LEGAL COUNSEL FOR INDIGENTS, MINIMUM ATTORNEY 
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS: CRIMINAL MATTERS § 6.1 (2004), http://www.nd.gov/indigents/docs/
performanceStandardsCriminal.pdf (stating that “counsel should meet with incarcerated clients 
within 24 hours after assignment to the case”); STATE BAR OF TEX., PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES 
FOR NON-CAPITAL CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION 3 (2011), https://www.texasbar.com/
AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home& Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=29497
(stating that “if the client is in custody, the initial interview should take place within three business 
days after counsel receives notice of assignment to the client’s case”).
351. KY. DEP’T OF PUB. ADVOCACY, KENTUCKY PRETRIAL RELEASE MANUAL (2013), 
https://www.pretrial.org/download/advocacy/Kentucky%20Pretrial%20Release%20Manual%20
-%20Kentucky%20Dept.%20of%20Public%20Advocacy%202013.pdf. 
352. COLO. CRIM. DEF. INST. ET AL., THE COLORADO BAIL BOOK: A DEFENSE PRACTITIONER’S
GUIDE TO ADULT PRETRIAL RELEASE (2015), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/
Colorado_Bail_Book_Pretrial_Release.pdf.
353. THE CONST. PROJECT NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., DON’T I NEED A LAWYER?
PRETRIAL JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT FIRST JUDICIAL BAIL HEARING 32–36 (2015), 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/RTC-DINAL_3.18.15.pdf 
(discussing studies done by the Manhattan Bail Project in New York City, the National Institute 
of Justice in Passaic, New Jersey, Shelby County, Tennessee, and Palm Beach, Florida, and the 
Baltimore City Lawyers at Bail Project in Baltimore Maryland).
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B.  The Nature of Pretrial Detention
The Supreme Court recognizes “a distinction between punitive 
measures that may not constitutionally be imposed prior to a 
determination of guilt and regulatory restraints that may.”354 The Court 
has regarded pretrial detention as regulatory and not penal.355 In reaching 
that conclusion, the Court has looked at the legislative intent behind 
statutes that authorize pretrial detention and concluded that pretrial 
detention is designed to ensure a defendant’s appearance in court, 
safeguard the judicial process, and ensure community safety.356
That being said, the Court has also warned that “the mere invocation 
of a legitimate purpose will not justify particular restrictions and 
conditions of confinement amounting to punishment.”357 Even assuming 
that pretrial restrictions on a defendant’s liberty serve legitimate 
regulatory purposes, it is still necessary to determine whether those 
restrictions are reasonably tailored to achieve those purposes.358
When making a determination whether a statute is penal or regulatory, 
in addition to looking at legislative intent, the Court has also identified a 
number of factors that should be considered:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or 
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a 
punishment[,] whether it comes into play only on a finding 
of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional 
aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether 
the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether 
an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be 
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears 
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose 
assigned . . . .359
Two factors justify a reevaluation of the character of pretrial detention 
at the state level: the effectiveness of alternative forms of monitoring to 
ensure a defendant’s return to court and the widespread passage of bail 
jumping statutes. 
                                                                                                                     
354. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979).
355. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
356. Id. at 747. 
357. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984).
358. Id. (“Even given, therefore, that pretrial detention may serve legitimate regulatory 
purposes, it is still necessary to determine whether the terms and conditions of confinement . . . are 
in fact compatible with those purposes.”).
359. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
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1.  Prohibition on Excessiveness
Prior to the development of pretrial service programs, the pretrial 
detention of a defendant to ensure the defendant’s return to court may 
have been the only reliable option available. However, there are now a 
wide range of options that could be used to ensure that the defendant 
returns to court.360 Pretrial service organizations can actively monitor 
defendants who are high risk and can use home confinement or GPS to 
monitor lower risk defendants.361 Not all jurisdictions have invested in 
pretrial services or alternatives to incarceration, but that does not change 
the fact that they are available to them and are actually less costly than 
relying on pretrial incarceration.362
One of the factors to consider when evaluating whether restrictions on 
liberty are penal or regulatory is whether it appears excessive in light of 
the other options available. Considering the successful implementation of 
pretrial services programs and alternatives to incarceration at the federal 
level, the continued reliance on pretrial detention to ensure appearance in 
court at the state level seems excessive and therefore punitive. 
2.  Administrative Detention for Something That Is a Crime
Bail jumping statutes make the failure to appear in court a separate 
offense.363 A defendant who fails to appear runs the risk of being charged 
with a separate offense, one which she is very likely to be convicted of, 
even if she is acquitted of the underlying offense that gave rise to the 
charge of bail jumping. Bail jumping statutes have proliferated over the 
last fifty years and their existence raises questions about the nature of 
pretrial detention.364 If pretrial detention is seen as a means of ensuring a 
                                                                                                                     
360. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 289, at 34 (“There are other options for the safe release 
of many more defendants either on their own recognizance or with the aid of special conditions 
and supervision. These options, deployed under the umbrella term of pretrial services, require 
jurisdictions to develop the capacity to conduct formal risk assessments, to speed the time from 
arrest to initial bail hearing, and to invest in pretrial supervision resources to enable the non-
financial release of those deemed too high a risk for ROR.”).
361. See, e.g., Pretrial Services, ALACHUA CTY. http://www.alachuacounty.us/Depts/Court
Services/Pages/PretrialServices.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2017). 
362. Supervision Costs Significantly Less Than Incarceration in Federal System, U.S. CTS.
(July 18, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/07/18/supervision-costs-significantly-less-
incarceration-federal-system (“Pretrial detention for a defendant was nearly 10 times more 
expensive than the cost of supervision of a defendant by a pretrial services officer in the federal 
system.”).
363. Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO.
L.J. 1435, 1455–56 (2009).
364. Id. at 1457 (“Today, only four states do not separately penalize failure to appear: South 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Indiana. Moreover, almost every jurisdiction has actively 
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defendant’s appearance in court, the fact that failing to appear is itself a 
crime suggests that pretrial detention is penal since “the behavior to 
which it applies is already a crime.”365
IV. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court noted that “there are few 
defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best 
lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses.”366 The fact 
that the wealthy have an absolute right to have counsel present at their 
initial appearance and the poor do not raises equal protection concerns. 
In addition, the continued reliance on financial securities when making 
pretrial release decisions means that the wealthy go free while the poor 
remain in jail.
A. Attachment and Appearance 
The Court held in Rothgery that “a criminal defendant’s initial 
appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against 
him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of adversary 
judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.”367 The Court explicitly did not rule on the issue of when 
a court had to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant.368 The Court has 
historically made a distinction between when the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel “attaches” and when a court must actually provide counsel to 
a defendant.369 The statement by the Court that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel has “attached” is simply another way of saying that a 
criminal prosecution has begun. 
The distinction the Court makes between the availability of counsel 
and the need for counsel is troubling. In effect, the Court is saying that a 
defendant has an absolute right to have an attorney appear at his initial 
appearance, if the defendant can afford to do so, since the Sixth 
                                                                                                                     
tinkered with their bail jumping provisions—thirty-five statutes were substantially amended 
within the past fifteen years, many multiple times.” (footnote omitted)).
365. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
366. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
367. Rothgery v. Gillespie, 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008).
368. Id. (“Our holding is narrow. We do not decide whether the 6-month delay in 
appointment of counsel resulted in prejudice to Rothgery’s Sixth Amendment rights, and have no 
occasion to consider what standards should apply in deciding this.”); see also id. at 213–14 (Alito, 
J., concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion because I do not understand it to hold that a defendant 
is entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel as soon as his Sixth Amendment right attaches. 
As I interpret our precedents, the term ‘attachment’ signifies nothing more than the beginning of 
the defendant’s prosecution. It does not mark the beginning of a substantive entitlement to the 
assistance of counsel.”).
369. See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text. 
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Amendment right to counsel has “attached” once formal charges have
been filed and his liberty is subject to restriction. At the same time, even 
though the right to counsel has “attached,” the State is under no obligation 
to provide counsel to an indigent defendant at his initial appearance when 
his liberty is subject to restriction. In effect, the Court is sanctioning two 
justice systems: one for the wealthy and one for the poor.
B.  Fair Opportunity to Present a Defense
The Supreme Court “has long recognized that when a State brings its 
judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, 
it must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to 
present his defense.”370 However, the equal protection afforded to 
indigent defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment is not without 
limits. In finding that indigent defendants have no right to counsel for a 
discretionary appeal, the Court observed “the fact that a particular service 
might be of benefit to an indigent defendant does not mean that the 
service is constitutionally required. The duty of the State under our cases 
is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a 
criminal defendant . . . .”371 The Court has acknowledged the fact that an 
indigent defendant is “somewhat handicapped in comparison with a 
wealthy defendant who has counsel assisting him in every conceivable 
manner at every stage in the proceeding.”372 The mere fact that the 
appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant would be beneficial 
does not mean that the Equal Protection Clause requires it. 
There can be no doubt that the presence of counsel would be a benefit 
to indigent defendants during a bail hearing, but the question is whether 
the absence of counsel deprives an indigent defendant of a “fair 
opportunity to present his defense.”373 The Court has held that “the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, 
derives from the belief that justice cannot be equal where, simply as a 
result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate 
meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake.”374
                                                                                                                     
370. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985).
371. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment “does not require 
absolute equality or precisely equal advantages”); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[The State is not required to] equalize economic conditions. A man 
of means may be able to afford the retention of an expensive, able counsel not within reach of a 
poor man’s purse. Those are contingencies of life which are hardly within the power, let alone the 
duty, of a State to correct or cushion.”).
372. Ross, 417 U.S. at 616.
373. Ake, 470 U.S. at 76.
374. Id.; see also Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19 (“There can be no equal justice where the kind of 
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”). 
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The inability of indigent defendants to meaningfully participate in a bail 
hearing, a judicial proceeding where their liberty is at stake, renders 
counsel not just beneficial, but essential.375 Without counsel, from the 
perspective of most indigent defendants, the bail hearing is reduced to a 
“meaningless ritual.”376
C.  Bail Schedules
Over fifty years ago the Supreme Court made it clear that “[t]here can 
be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the 
amount of money he has.”377 The Court has also said that “the Fourteenth 
Amendment weighs the interests of rich and poor criminals in equal 
scale” and has held “that to interpose any financial consideration between 
an indigent prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state right to sue for 
his liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal protection of the laws.”378
When considering cases involving indigent defendants who were 
imprisoned because of their inability to pay a fine, the Court has found
that it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause to imprison an indigent 
defendant beyond the statutory maximum fixed by statute who is 
financially unable to pay a fine.379 The Equal Protection Clause also 
“prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then 
automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant 
is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.”380 Similarly, the 
Court has found that an indigent defendant’s probation may not be 
summarily terminated for a failure to pay a fine since “[t]o do otherwise 
would deprive the probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, 
through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine. Such a deprivation 
would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”381
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of 
fixed-sum bail schedules. However, in Stack v. Boyle,382 the Court 
required an individualized determination regarding appropriate 
conditions of pretrial release.383 With that in mind, the U.S. Court of 
                                                                                                                     
375. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“That government hires lawyers 
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest 
indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.”).
376. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).
377. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19.
378. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709, 714 (1961).
379. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244 (1970).
380. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (quoting Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 
509 (1970)).
381. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983).
382. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
383. Id. at 5. 
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Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has noted that while the “[u]tilization of a 
master bond schedule provides speedy and convenient release for those 
who have no difficulty in meetings its requirements . . . incarceration of
those who cannot, without meaningful consideration of other possible 
alternatives, infringes on both due process and equal protection 
requirements.”384
The Department of Justice has taken the position that “any bail or 
bond scheme that mandates payment of pre-fixed amounts for different 
offenses in order to gain pretrial release, without any regard for 
indigence, not only violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection clause, but also constitutes bad public policy.”385 The 
American Bar Association has adopted the same position: 
Financial conditions should be the result of an individualized 
decision taking into account the special circumstances of 
each defendant, the defendant’s ability to meet the financial 
conditions and the defendant’s flight risk, and should never 
be set by reference to a predetermined schedule of amounts 
fixed according to the nature of the charge.386
The setting of bail on an arrest warrant raises the same concerns 
associated with the use of bail schedules. A judicial officer who affixes 
an amount of bail to an arrest warrant does so upon a finding that there is 
probable cause to arrest but without any specific information regarding 
the defendant.387 In effect, the judicial officer is setting bail based solely 
on the offense charged without regard to the financial resources of the 
defendant.
CONCLUSION
Over the past three decades, the number of annual admissions to local 
jails nearly doubled, from 6 million in 1983 to 11.7 million in 2013.388
The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that 744,600 people were 
confined in county and city jails at midyear 2014, and 62% of those 
confined, 467,500 people, were not convicted.389 The costs associated 
with pretrial incarceration are enormous; one estimate is that states spent 
                                                                                                                     
384. Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (footnote omitted).
385. Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Varden v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15-cv-
34-MHT-WC, 2015 WL 5387219 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015) (No. 26), 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/file/761266/download. 
386. Criminal Justice Section Standards: Pretrial Release, supra note 249.
387. See supra Subsection I.B.4.   
388. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 288, at 7. 
389. TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT 
MIDYEAR 2014, at 1, 3 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf. 
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$17 billion on pretrial detention in 2012.390 The impact that pretrial 
incarceration has on a defendant is obvious: “The time spent in jail 
awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on the individual. It often means 
loss of a job; it disrupts family life; and it enforces idleness. Most jails 
offer little or no recreational or rehabilitative programs. The time spent 
in jail is simply dead time.”391
Despite the enormous costs associated with pretrial detention, states 
have failed to adopt the reforms instituted fifty years ago at the federal 
level. Predictive determinations regarding guilt, an overemphasis on the 
potential dangerousness of defendants, a lack of adequate pretrial 
services, and continued reliance on financial securities still characterize 
state systems. 
During that same time, the Supreme Court has done little to ensure 
that the constitutional rights of indigent criminal defendants are protected 
when they appear for the first time before a judicial officer that has the 
power to restrict their liberty, despite the fact that the setting of bail 
implicates an indigent defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment and the right to due process and equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has never found the setting of bail to 
be a critical stage of the proceedings that would require the presence of 
counsel or discussed what procedural safeguards should be in place to 
protect the rights of indigent defendants. These failures may have 
contributed to the rising rates of pretrial incarceration.
It should come as no surprise that the constitutionality of state systems 
for setting bail have gone unchallenged for so long since the systems are 
designed to delay the appointment of counsel. As the Supreme Court has 
said, “[N]ew cases expose old infirmities which apathy or absence of 
challenge has permitted to stand.”392
The Court has acknowledged that the “extension of the right to 
counsel to events before trial has resulted from changing patterns of 
criminal procedure and investigation that have tended to generate pretrial 
events that might appropriately be considered to be parts of the trial 
itself.”393 It is time for the Court to recognize that changing patterns of 
criminal procedure have made a defendant’s initial appearance a critical 
stage of the proceeding.
                                                                                                                     
390. Christopher Ingraham, Why We Spend Billions to Keep Half a Million Unconvicted 
People Behind Bars, WASH. POST (June 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2015/06/11/why-we-spend-billions-to-keep-half-a-million-unconvicted-people-behind-bars/. 
391. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532–33 (1972) (footnote omitted).
392. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 245 (1970).
393. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310 (1973).
55
Gross: The Right To Counsel But Not The Presence of Counsel: A Survey of
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
56
Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss3/4
